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Abstract
I present three essays discussing the impact of archaic institutions and technol-
ogy on inequality in wages and political participation. First I examine a modern
facet of the Indian caste system: political quotas for disadvantaged minorities and
their impact on political participation. I find that aggregate turnout falls by 9% of
the baseline and right-wing parties win 50% more often, but electoral competition is
not significantly affected. Detailed individual-level data for one state suggests that
voter participation falls among women and minorities. This suggests that restricting
candidate identity to minorities may cause some bias in voter participation.
Next, I study caste and human capital: specifically why workers remain in low-
paying hereditary occupations, providing an explanation for both occupational spe-
cialization and hereditary occupations. I use a simple model of insurance provision
in which parents pass on human capital to their children in return for insurance in
the event of sickness, and find that workers with low human capital are likelier to
participate in the arrangement, and that a higher cost of sickness can sustain higher
human capital transfers.
I conclude by studying human capital and technology- the impact of information
and communication technologies (ICT) on wage inequality. We tested the hypoth-
esis that information and communication technologies (ICT) polarize labour mar-
kets, by increasing demand for the highly educated at the expense of the middle
educated, with little effect on low-educated workers. Using data on the US, Japan,
and nine European countries from 1980-2004, we find that industries with faster ICT
growth shifted demand from middle educated workers to highly educated workers,
9
consistent with ICT-based polarization. Trade openness is also associated with po-
larization, but this is not robust to controlling for Research and Development. Tech-
nologies account for up to a quarter of the growth in demand for highly educated
workers.
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Introduction
I Overview
The following essays consider one of the several paradoxical facets of develop-
ing countries: the tension between ancient institutions and the forces of modernity,
whether they arrive in the form of competition, technology or both. This is particu-
larly striking in India, a country in which rapid technological advancement coexists
sometimes uneasily with the stubborn persistence of archaic institutions. One such
institution is that of the caste system, which has exhibited considerable resilience in
the face of economic growth and urbanisation, and shows every sign of using infor-
mation and communication technology to further entrench itself (as evinced by the
persistence of endogamy in modern India (Banerjee, Duflo, Ghatak, and Lafortune
(2009))).
The first two essays consider two aspects of the caste system. Chapter 1 deals
with an attempt to correct the disenfranchisement of citizens at the bottom of the
caste hierarchy, and Chapter 2 considers the benefits of occupational specialisation
and intergenerational occupational rigidity. The final two chapters consider the ac-
cumulation of human capital first in an environment with imperfect capital markets
and no obsolescence, and second through the lens of Information and Communica-
tion Technologies and their impact on skill demand.
11
II Chapter Summaries
II.1 Chapter 1
A representative democracy should seek to reflect the needs of its entire popu-
lation, but there is a concern that a nation’s elected representatives do not serve the
needs of its most vulnerable citizens. Many countries, concerned that these citizens
are not adequately represented in their governments, have sought to redress the bal-
ance with quotas. Advocates of the policy suggest that the identity of a legislator
affect her policy preferences, so at the least imposing quotas may have redistributive
effects (Pande (2003), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)).
One key assumption made when assessing the impact of quotas on policy prefer-
ences is that quotas change only legislator identity, leaving voter identity unaffected.
Moreover, critics of quotas claim that quotas are by their nature uncompetitive, since
by changing the candidate pool they distort incentives and weaken electoral com-
petition.
In Chapter 1, I use a provision of the Constitution of India to examine the causal
impact of the introduction of quotas for disadvantaged minorities on electoral com-
petition and voter participation, at the level of the constituency, and find that while
quotas have no discernible adverse effect on electoral competition, they depress
turnout. Detailed data for a subsample suggest that quotas depress turnout espe-
cially among women and minorities.
II.2 Chapter 2
While Chapter 1 dealt with a present-day outcome of the caste system, I now turn
attention to one reason for its persistence- intergenerational occupational rigidity as
a means of procuring insurance in the presence of imperfect credit markets.
Occupational rigidity is a much-studied phenomenon. Explanations vary from
the cost of acquiring human capital in the presence of indivisible human capital in-
vestments and capital market imperfections (Bannerjee and Newman (1993)) to the
12
information advantages of family, village, ethnic or occupationally specialized net-
works (Akerlof (1976), Greif (1993), Freitas (2006)). One persuasive explanation is
that social networks provide access to consumption-smoothing (Munshi and Rosen-
zweig (2009)).
I use a two-period Overlapping Generations model in which a parent with an
endowment of occupation-specific human capital transfers costly human capital to
her offspring, in return for full insurance if the parent suffers an accident, with the
penalty for default being a bar from access to to the insurance arrangement. I find
that agents with low human capital are more liable to participate in the insurance
arrangement, and that the maximum sustainable human capital transfer rises with
the cost of sickness.
II.3 Chapter 3
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with two conflicting forces on human capital- in Chapter
2 agents accumulated human capital in order to have a means of insurance against
sickness, in an environment with no obsolescence owing to technology, whereas in
Chapter 3 I consider the impact of Information and Communication Technology on
the demand for workers across varying occupation and education groups.
The demand for highly-skilled workers in the UK, USA and a range of devel-
oped countries has risen significantly in the past three decades, outstripping even
the rise in supply of workers with a college education over the same period. Most
authorities agree that this increase is brought about by technological changes rather
than a shift in trade with low-wage countries.
A persuasive hypothesis is that technical change complements highly-skilled
workers at the benefit of all others, but a more granular view of the wage distribu-
tion suggests that other factors may be in play. An increase in demand for highly-
skilled workers is reflected in higher wages, but interestingly, in the USA, the ratio
of the wages of workers in the 90th percentile to those in the 50th percentile have
risen far faster than those in the 50th percentile to those in the 10th percentile and
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lower.
An explanation uniting both these observations is provided by the “polarization
hypothesis”(famously propounded by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003)), which
suggests that an increase in the use of Information and Communication Technology
complements those performing non-routine tasks but substitutes those performing
routine tasks.
Many non-routine cognitive tasks (e.g. surgery or consulting) are performed by
highly educated workers, while many routine cognitive tasks (e.g. clerical) were
performed by middle-skilled workers, who were gradually replaced by ongoing
computerization. Low-skilled workers frequently perform non-routine manual tasks
(e.g. grading and sorting of agricultural products). Routine manual tasks per-
formed by low-skilled workers (e.g. assembly-line manufacturing) dropped out
of the pictures after the 1970s, and so the greatest gains were experienced by the
highly-skilled group, and the greatest loss by the middle group.
Using data from the United States Census and the Directory of Occupational Ti-
tles, we show first that middle-skilled workers cluster disproportionately in routine
cognitive tasks, and low-skilled workers have a high presence in non-routine man-
ual tasks. Then, using the EUKLEMS dataset providing capital accounts and labour
disaggregated by education group for a panel of 11 OECD countries (the US, Japan
and 9 other OECD countries) over 25 years (1980-2004), show that those industries
with the fastest increase in ICT compensation did indeed show the greatest increase
in demand for college-educated workers and the greatest fall in demand for middle-
skilled workers, consistent with the polarization hypothesis.
III Contributions to the Literature
III.1 Chapter 1
In Chapter 1, I consider the impact of legislative quotas on the voting population,
which has so far been neglected in favour of studying the impact of these measures
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on candidates. I provide an understanding of the impact of quotas on electoral com-
petition, how many vote and who votes as a result of quotas. Chapter 1 also con-
tains an analysis of political reservation at the constituency level, which is not only
a meaningful unit of consideration for political variables, but examines permanent
quotas at a more disaggregated level than the state.
III.2 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 provides a simple model of human capital accumulation as a means
of consumption-smoothing, and its theoretical contribution is to unite the views of
castes or guilds as a means of safeguarding human capital or intellectual property
with the more recent literature treating social networks as a means of contract en-
forcement, eradicating information asymmetries or providing insurance.
III.3 Chapter 3
This paper is the first to provide direct international evidence that skills-technology
complementarity benefits highly-skilled workers at the cost of middle-skilled work-
ers, consistent with the polarization hypothesis. Other work has shown a similar
substitution Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Autor and Dorn (2009) but only for
America. Prior to this, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) show that the rise in the use
of computers between 1984 and 1993 was correlated to a fall overall in the demand
for high-school graduates between 1979 and 1993, but we provide evidence for a
panel of 11 countries over a longer time-period.
15
List of Tables
B.1 Constituency Averages: Chhatisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh
and Rajasthan 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
B.2 Constituency Electoral Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
B.3 Averages of Dependent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
B.4 Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections
from 2001-2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
B.5 Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections
from 2001-2008) on Incidence of Victory of Party Categories . . . . . 97
B.6 Effect of dereservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections
from 2001-2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
B.7 Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections
from 1993-1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
B.8 Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 on success of
political parties (Elections from 1993-1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
B.9 Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections
from 2001-2008): 5% cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
B.10 Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections
from 2001-2008): districts with both treated and untreated constituen-
cies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.11 Respondent Characteristics: Lokniti Constituencies, Karnataka Post-
Poll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.12 Constituency Averages at Baseline: Karnataka 2001 . . . . . . . . . . 104
B.13 Candidate Characteristics (Lokniti constituencies) . . . . . . . . . . . 105
B.14 Individual Voter Participation: Lokniti Karnataka 2008 Post-Poll . . . 106
G.1 Mean Standardized Scores by skill group - 1980 US data . . . . . . . . 133
G.2 Top occupations by share of workers of different skill levels, with task
measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
G.3 Summary Statistics by Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
G.4 Summary Statistics by Industry: 1980 levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
G.5 Summary Statistics by Industry: Changes from 1980-2004 . . . . . . . 137
G.6 Changes in Wage Bill Shares: 1980-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
G.7 Changes in Wage Bill Shares: 1980-2004 - Robustness checks . . . . . 139
G.8 Decomposing Changes in Relative Wage Bills into Wages and Hours 140
G.9 Trade and Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
G.10 List of all EUKLEMS Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
G.11 List of Industries Pooled by Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
G.12 Trade, ICT, and Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
16
G.13 Contribution of Changes in ICT and R&D to Changes in the High-
Skilled Wage Bill Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
17
List of Figures
A.1 Allocation of SC seats to a district . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.2 Identification of District Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.3 Identification of constituencies close to the threshold . . . . . . . . . 91
A.4 Discarding previously-reserved constituencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.5 Identification of Treatment and Control Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
E.1 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: h=.18 . . . . . . . . . 116
E.2 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: h=.5 . . . . . . . . . 117
E.3 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: I=0.01 . . . . . . . . 118
E.4 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: I=0.5 . . . . . . . . . 118
E.5 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: I=0.99 . . . . . . . . 118
E.6 Maximum Human Capital Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
E.7 Lower Bound of Maximum Human Capital Transfer . . . . . . . . . . 119
E.8 Minimum Human Capital Transfer Accepted by Child . . . . . . . . 120
E.9 Difference Between Maximum and Minimum Sustainable Human Cap-
ital Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
F.1 Cross Country Variation in Growth of High-skilled Wage Bill Shares
and ICT Intensity, 1980- 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
F.2 Cross Country Variation in Growth of Medium-skilled Wage Bill Shares
and ICT Intensity, 1980- 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
F.3 Cross Country Variation in Growth of Low-skilled Wage Bill Shares
and ICT Intensity, 1980- 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
F.4 Average Annual Percentage Point Changes in High, Medium and
Low-Skilled Wage Bill Shares over Six- Year Intervals from 1980-2004
(Eleven Country Average) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
F.5 Average Annual Percentage Point Changes in High, Medium and
Low-Skilled Wage Bill Shares over Six- Year Intervals from 1980-2004
(U.S. Average) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
F.6 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of High-Skilled Wage-Bill Share
and ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Whole Economy) . 127
F.7 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of High-Skilled Wage-Bill Share
and ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Traded Goods Only) 128
F.8 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of Medium-Skilled Wage-Bill Share
and ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Whole Economy) . 129
F.9 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of Medium-Skilled Wage-Bill Share
and ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Traded Goods Only) 130
F.10 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of Low-Skilled Wage-Bill Share
and ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Whole Economy) . 131
18
F.11 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of Low-Skilled Wage-Bill Share
and ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Traded Goods Only) 132
19
Chapter 1
Some Unintended Consequences of
Political Quotas
1.1 Introduction
Many countries have considered measures to increase the representation of mi-
norities and women, either through quotas or through gerrymandering1. In India,
quotas have been in place for disadvantaged groups since 1951, but the policy’s use
is widespread. In 2010, more than 30 countries in Asia, Africa, South America and
Europe had quotas for women in government.
Proponents of the policy point out that there is reason to believe that nonminor-
ity legislators have different policy preferences from legislators from disadvantaged
groups. So, in addition to considerations of fairness and equity, empirical evidence
suggests that increasing representation for disadvantaged groups may have redis-
tributive effects (Pande (2003), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)).
However, a common assumption made when assessing the impact of legislator
identity on policy is that the imposition of political quotas changes legislator iden-
tity only, while voter identity is unaffected (Pande (2003)). This is a strong assump-
1Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of America contains provisions that many conservative politi-
cians see as racial gerrymandering. See also Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct.2816(1993), in which the Supreme
Court ruled that the creation of a district in North Carolina in which minorities were in the majority
was unconstitutional.
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tion, and not innocuous. Critics of quotas, moreover, argue that they are discrimina-
tory, distort incentives and by their nature undermine the democratic process: inter-
vention in order to increase minority representation takes away the right of voters
to choose their representatives freely. Artificially restricting the pool of candidates
weakens electoral competition.
This paper uses a provision of the Constitution of India to examine the causal
impact of the introduction of quotas for disadvantaged minorities on electoral com-
petition and voter participation, at the level of the constituency.
The world’s most comprehensive political affirmative action programme takes
place in India, in which approximately a quarter of all state and national legislators
belong to disadvantaged groups. The representation of members belonging to his-
torically disadvantaged castes (Scheduled Castes or SCs) or tribes (Scheduled Tribes
or STs) is determined according to each decennial census, and the representation of
these groups in the state legislature is held to be as close as possible to their rep-
resentation in the population. Reservation is revisited with the publication of each
decennial census, but not before. When a constituency is reserved for SCs(STs) only
SC(ST) candidates may contest the election, although voters of all identities may
vote.
In 2008, after a long hiatus since 1981, a wave of redistricting (Delimitation) was
carried out, adjusting the representation of SCs and STs in state and national leg-
islatures according to the 2001 census. Four states (Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan and Chattisgarh) carried out elections using this adjusted representation.
The documentation released laid out the methodology of reservation transparently,
enabling me to construct for these states a unique dataset with those constituen-
cies which were reserved for the first time in 2008, as well as demographically
and economically comparable constituencies within the same administrative area
which narrowly missed the reservation cutoff and remained unreserved. I use a
Differences-in-Differences approach to examine the impact of political reservation
on turnout, the number of candidates contesting, the margin of victory and the
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probability of success of right-wing and left-wing parties, as well as those mobil-
ising lower-caste supporters (details in Section 1.2.4).
I find no impact on the number of candidates contesting and no impact on the
margin of victory, so these conventional measures of electoral competition are unaf-
fected by political quotas. However, turnout drops by 6 percentage points relative
to a baseline of 69 percentage points, and right-wing parties make up 26% more
of winners in reserved constituencies after reservation, compared to a baseline of
53%. Results using individual polling data suggest that women vote 15% less, and
minorities vote 9% less, in reserved constituencies after reservation.
There are many possible explanations, but at the very least this evidence suggests
that there are unintended consequences to political quotas- although most standard
measures of electoral competition are unaffected, voter participation falls, and seem-
ingly among the most vulnerable members of the population.
This is a concern, because for a complete picture of the impact of minority repre-
sentation on policy it seems reasonable to look at its impact on the size and composi-
tion of the voting population. We should be concerned if sections of the population
systematically choose to increase participation- or to reduce it. When suffrage is
extended to a group, public goods provision to the group improves as well. An
increase in the participation of underprivileged voters causes a rise in welfare ex-
penditure (Husted and Kenny (1997)) and public health and infrastructure spend-
ing (Lizzeri and Persico (2004)); better public goods provision (Naidu (2009)); better
health outcomes (Fujiwara (2010)) and better resource targeting (Besley, Pande, and
Rao (2005)).
This work belongs to several streams of work in the economic and political sci-
ence literature. There is of course a large body of work examining the impact of
legislator identity on policy, using the Indian experiment I discuss. In addition, the
work addresses literature discussing the impact on political competition of gerry-
mandering, as well as the literature on political participation and ethnic conflict.
There is a large literature on ethnic conflict in developing nations, starting from
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Donald Horowitz’s seminal work (Horowitz (1985)) and related to the Indian con-
text by Kanchan Chandra (Chandra (2003)) and the African context in Collier and
Vicente (2011), Collier and Vicente (2012). There is a recent literature on ethnic con-
flict and clientelism in democracies in Africa, considering the electoral success of
vote-buying and means of combatting it. Wantchekon (2003) finds that vote-buying
distorts redistribution, but proves electorally successful. Vicente and Wantchekon
(2009) find that increasing voter information and the political participation of women
is associated with a reduction in clientelism.
There is also a growing body of work examining the tradeoff between prefer-
ences regarding politician type and group identity: studies finding that increasing
voter ethnicisation in North India adversely affects candidate quality in dominant
groups (Banerjee and Pande (2007)) ; in contrast, finding that reservation, by creat-
ing a dominant group, tends to increase the competence of elected representatives,
and resolve the inability of candidates to credibly commit to a platform (Munshi and
Rosenzweig (2008)). Atchade and Wantchekon (2007) find that electoral support for
broad-based reform is greater when voters share ethnic ties with candidates.
There is little work examining the impact of quotas on the size and composi-
tion of the voting population. The political science literature, while considering
increased minority representation as a determinant of turnout, focusses on parti-
san gerrymandering. Discussing the merits of racial gerrymandering, Cameron,
Epstein, and O’Halloran (1996), examining majority-minority districts in America,
suggest that there may be a tradeoff between ”descriptive” representation- i.e. in-
creasing the number of minority officeholders- and ”substantive” representation-
policies benefitting minorities. See Besley and Case (2003) for a survey; Coate and
Knight (2007) for a model of optimal redistricting.
There is no consensus on the impact of majority-minority districts on voter par-
ticipation: early work suggests that African-American participation might increase,
but absent substantive representation, might peter out (See Barreto, Segura, and
Woods (2004) for a review of the literature, as well as the argument that other mi-
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norities may participate more as a result of redistricting).
The existing work on political quotas tends to mainly examine quotas using the
lens of the impact of legislator identity on policy (see Duflo (2005) for a review) with
some recent work examining the impact of political reservation on poverty (Chin
and Prakash (2009)), and the impact of political reservation for women on reports of
crimes against women (Iyer, Mani, Mishra, and Topalova (2011)).
Previous work on political reservation in India has examined either the state
level (Pande (2003)) or village council level (Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)). Mea-
sures at both levels are not quite comparable, however. At the village council level,
quotas rotate on a predictable basis, so performance incentives are fundamentally
different from quotas at state and national level, which are expected to be perma-
nent. I examine permanent quotas at the level of the constituency, which enables
me to look at the impact of restricting candidate identity for a material election at a
quite disaggregated level.
Ford and Pande (2011), in a survey of the literature on gender quotas, state that
there is limited evidence on the impact of quotas on turnout. Kurosaki and Mori
(May 2011) examine the correlation between the probability of minority citizens vot-
ing and the incidence of being in a constituency reserved for minorities, but they do
not exploit time variation and they cannot directly identify the causal impact of
reservation on voting outcomes.
This work makes the following broad contributions: an understanding of the im-
pact of quotas on the voting population and electoral competition, and an analysis
of political reservation at the constituency level, which examines permanent quotas
at a more disaggregated level than the state and is a meaningful unit of considera-
tion for political variables.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 1.2 provides a conceptual
framework. Section 1.3 provides a background of political reservation in India. Sec-
tion 1.4 sets out my identification strategy in more detail, and Section 1.5 sets out
the empirical specification. Section 1.6 provides some data and summary statistics
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and Section 1.7 results for aggregate turnout and competition. Section 1.8 describes
individual-level data for one state in the sample, along with results. Section 1.9
concludes, with some ideas for further work.
1.2 Theoretical Predictions about Turnout, Electoral Com-
petition and Party Bias
In this section, I discuss the extant theory regarding the impact of restricting
legislator identity on turnout and electoral competition, and its main predictions.
There are no clear theoretical predictions regarding the impact of political quo-
tas on turnout, competitiveness or party bias, since the phenomenon has not been
explicitly modelled. We can, however, disentangle some of the effects of the impo-
sition of political quotas on turnout, electoral competition and party bias.
Political quotas (or “reservation”in the Indian example) imply restricting the
pool of eligible candidates in a single-member jurisdiction to a subset of the pop-
ulation. This has a host of possible effects on the number and type of legislators
contesting 2, but here I enumerate what certainly happens: all candidates now be-
long to the same broad ethnic group; a subset of minorities is guaranteed represen-
tation and all candidates are now more alike on at least one dimension.
What theory there is offers very different predictions, depending on initial con-
ditions.
1.2.1 Ratio of Candidates to Electors
The impact of reservation on the number of candidates depends crucially on
whether reservation induces new minority candidates to contest (generating a new
pool) or whether those candidates who would contest elections after reservation did
so prior to the policy anyway. In the first case, the impact of the policy would be
2One obvious one being that minority candidates may well be less educated, on average, than
nonminority ones
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ambiguous. In the second, trivially the ratio of candidates to electors is lower in
reserved constituencies after reservation than in nonreserved constituencies.
1.2.2 Margin of Victory
The impact of reservation on the margin of victory goes in the same direction as
variation within the pool of minority candidates. If the two minority candidates are
closer (in quality, for example) than are a minority and nonminority candidate, then
the margin of victory should reduce. If not, then it should widen.
1.2.3 Turnout
Voting behaviour has long been a vexed question in the theoretical and empirical
literature, exemplified by the “paradox of voting”: i.e. with costly voting and large
populations (and therefore a small probability of being pivotal) nobody ought to
vote (Downs (1957); Ordeshook and Riker (1968)); see Feddersen (2004) for a survey.
Reservation could affect turnout through a large number of mechanisms, which
would pull in different directions. Here I enumerate some of these mechanisms, and
predictions consistent with these mechanisms.
1.2.3.1 Competition
There is a long tradition in the political science literature that turnout is higher
in elections expected to be close. (from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983), in close elec-
tions, the probability of being pivotal increases; from Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975)
voters seek to minimise their regret in the event of their preferred candidate losing
by a narrow margin; see Geys (2006) for a review). If reservation affects turnout
through competition, turnout should go in the same direction as electoral competition,
irrespective of the ethnic group of voters.
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1.2.3.2 Expressive Voting
The idea of a benefit from voting is an old one in the political science literature,
whether it be a desire to do one’s democratic duty (Downs (1957)) or to assert one’s
partisanship (Ordeshook and Riker (1968)). In this setting, voters derive benefit
from voting for candidates sharing their group identity. After reservation, a subset
of minorities is guaranteed representation. Nonminority voters and minority vot-
ers who are not represented are effectively disenfranchised and lose their incentive
to vote, and minority voters guaranteed representation have no added incentive to
vote, since a candidate from their broad ethnic group is guaranteed to win. If this
mechanism were in operation, turnout on average would fall for all groups, particu-
larly for elites and non-represented minorities.
1.2.3.3 Identity as Information
While “expressive voting”explores rational participation, others consider ratio-
nal abstention. For instance, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) posit that in elec-
tions in which candidates have distinct positions and voters are asymmetrically in-
formed and vary in partisanship, it may be rational for uninformed nonpartisan
voters to abstain3. Aker, Collier, and Vicente (2011) find that targeted information
campaigns increase the participation of voters in Mozambique 4. In the setting I
consider, it is possible that voters use a candidate’s group identity as a proxy for in-
formation about her quality, policy preferences or both. Once all candidates belong
to the same ethnic group, a salient source of information is lost. Were this to operate,
reservation should depress turnout among uninformed voters.
3Making voting more salient can also increase turnout, dating from the study of Gosnell (1927),
who found for presidential elections in 1921 and municipal elections in 1925
4See also Pande (2011) for a review of the literature on voter information, electoral accountability
and governance
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1.2.4 Party Bias
In the current setting, I consider parties based on two broad criteria, redistribu-
tion (i.e. whether a party have a history of opposing policies (e.g. directed taxation)
that redistribute income from the wealthy to the poor) and reservation (i.e. whether
a party has a history of opposing measures that redistribute resources towards dis-
advantaged minorities). Parties that answer “Yes”to both questions are classed as
“Right-Wing”5. Parties that answer “No”to both questions (or who have a history
of favouring redistribution along either dimension) are classed as “Left-Wing”6. A
third category is “Lower-Caste parties”, who direct their appeal specifically towards
voters from the bottom of Hinduism’s caste hierarchy 7. What does reservation im-
ply for the success of these groups of parties? Effects operate along two dimensions,
the effect on candidates, and that on voters.
1.2.4.1 Candidates
Does reservation induce changes in the distribution of right-wing, left-wing and
lower-caste parties among contesting parties? If so, then in constituencies where
right-wing/left-wing/lower-caste parties win disproportionately, we should expect
to see these parties make a higher fraction of contesting candidates. If we find no
significant difference in the distribution of all contesting parties between treated
and untreated constituencies, any difference we find is due to the efficiency of these
parties in mobilising support from voters (see the “mobilisation”models of Nalebuff
and Schachar (1999), for instance, in which group leaders exert social pressure to
mobilise their followers).
5In practice, this is most usually the “Bharatiya Janata Party”(or “Indian People’s Party”), a party
which is socially conservative, in favour of free markets and of whose base upper-caste Hindus make
a large fraction.
6This group is large, including the Indian National Congress (India’s oldest political party) and
Communist Party of India, and offshoots thereof.
7In practice, this is the “Bahujan Samaj Party”(or “Oppressed People’s Party”).
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1.2.4.2 Voters
Does reservation induce changes in the composition of the voting population in
order to disproportionately favour a group of political parties? If so, then in con-
stituencies where right-wing/left-wing/lower-caste parties win disproportionately,
we should expect to see voters identifying themselves as supporters of right-wing,
left-wing and lower-caste parties (respectively) should make a higher fraction of the
voting population.
Note further that while the above discussion makes no definitive predictions re-
garding the distribution of political parties as a result of reservation, it offers some
suggestive leads as to the composition of the voting population- in particular, it
suggests that uninformed voters may abstain. If a lack of information is also cor-
related with a lack of education or wealth, then when uninformed voters drop out
local elites make a higher fraction of the voting population, which means that if
”informed” voters disproportionately favour a political party, reservation will bias
victory in favour of that party.
1.3 Reservation in India
After 1950, the Indian Government enforced mandated representation for tra-
ditionally under-represented minorities, the Scheduled Castes (SCs) (who belong
to castes at the bottom of Hinduism’s caste hierarchy) and Scheduled Tribes (STs)
(members of which belong to tribes living in remote areas, historically cut off from
technology, education and healthcare). As near as possible, the representation from
each state in State and National Legislative Assemblies would be equal to the pro-
portion of their population in the state, according to the last decennial census. While
the representation of these communities in the population varies continuously, their
representation in the legislature varies with a lag in intercensal years. The fraction of
reservation has remained fixed since the 1981 census. In 2008 the Delimitation Com-
mission of India conducted a revision according to the 2001 census for elections in
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or after 2008.
When a seat is reserved for a member of the Scheduled Castes (Tribes), only
Scheduled Caste (Tribe) candidates may contest, though all voters on the electoral
roll may vote. From 1962, all constituencies are single-member jurisdictions. Elec-
tions are conducted on a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system: the candidate with the
highest number of votes wins and represents the constituency in the state legislative
assembly.
One difference between reservation in the state and national assemblies and that
at the Panchayat (village council) level is that in the former case reserved seats do
not rotate- a seat, once reserved, will remain so as long as it meets the criteria of the
Election Commission.
1.4 Identification Strategy
Quota allocations are determined at three levels: State, District and Constituency.
The hierarchy is as follows: directly beneath the state is a district, which comprises
many constituencies. A district is allocated SC seats in a proportion roughly equal
to how many of the state’s SCs live in that district. Constituencies in a district are
ranked in descending order of proportion of SCs until the district quota is satisfied.
Figure A.1 illustrates the process of allocation of reserved constituencies to a
district. If State X has 15 SC seats and 20% of the state’s SCs live in district A, district
A gets 3 SC seats. Constituencies are ranked in descending order of SC population
until the quota is reached.
Since seats are reserved for minorities based on their representation in the con-
stituency, the identification of reservation on turnout or electoral competition is
not straightforward. However, the procedure described suggests a Differences-in-
Differences approach 8:
8The control group is identified using an approach akin to that of Clots-Figueras (2007) who,
examining the impact of female legislators on education expenditure, instruments female presence
in administration with females who won elections against men by a narrow majority; Fujiwara (2010)
compares the impact of the introduction of Electronic Voting Machines between cities of population
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1.4.1 Construction of Treatment and Control Groups (SC constituen-
cies)
For each district, I identify the lowest SC proportion for an SC-reserved con-
stituency. This becomes the cutoff for reserved constituencies in each district.
Figure A.2 illustrates the district cutoff in our example. 3 seats were reserved for
SCs in district A, and the lowest SC population among reserved seats was 30%.
I then narrow consideration to constituencies with an SC population within 3
percentage points of the district cutoff: in our example, as illustrated by Figure A.3,
constituencies with an SC population at least equal to 27% and no more than 33%.
I discard constituencies that were previously reserved, since I am interested in
the effects of being reserved for the first time in 2008 (see figureA.4). This leaves me
with the following subgroups: (i) the treatment group, constituencies which were
switched for the first time from nonreserved to SC in 2008 and with an SC proportion
no more than 3 per cent higher than the district cutoff; and (ii) the control group,
constituencies which were never reserved and with an SC proportion no more than
3 per cent lower than the district cutoff.
As in Figure A.5, the treatment group would be: first- time - reserved SC con-
stituencies with an SC population no more than 33 per cent. The control group
would be never - reserved constituencies with an SC population no lower than 27
per cent.
1.4.2 Construction of Treatment and Control Groups (ST constituen-
cies)
The process of allocating quotas to STs is different, since this community is more
geographically concentrated. The state quota for STs is determined similarly to that
for SCs, but constituencies are ranked in descending order of ST population until the
state quota is reached. For this reason, using a similar identification strategy leaves
at least as high as 100000 and cities just below that population threshold.
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very few observations, so from now on I confine my discussion to reservation for
SCs.
1.5 Empirical Specification
I wish to measure the impact of restricting candidate identity on turnout, the
ratio of candidates to electors, the margin of victory and the probability of success
of right-wing parties. I use a Differences-in-Differences approach, and regress de-
pendent variable Y (turnout, the ratio of candidates to electors, the difference in
voteshare between the winner and runner-up or the probability of success of vari-
ous party groups) on the incidence of being in a constituency reserved for the first
time in 2008 (TREAT), the incidence of being in a year after reservation (POST)
and that of being in a reserved constituency after reservation (TREAT·POST), in
constituency c in year t.
Yct = β0 + β1TREATc + β2POSTt + β3TREATc · POSTt + uct (1.1)
β3 identifies the effect of reservation on turnout, electoral competition and party
bias under the identifying assumption of common trends between treatment and
control groups. In the following section, I test for systematic initial differences be-
tween the treatment and control groups.
1.6 Data
Four states in India carried out elections using the new rules in 2008: Chhatis-
garh, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Rajasthan. Applying the rule described
above leaves me with 107 constituencies for SC constituencies. The four states in
the sample carried out elections in 2003 and 2004. Delimitation in line with the
2001 Census was announced in 2006, so I discount bias owing to prior anticipation
of treatment at least within the sample. The Delimitation Commission of India re-
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leased detailed documents along with the 2008 announcement, from which I can
reconstruct the reservation of each constituency. This process is not as transparent
for previous rounds of reservation, so I restrict myself to one election year before
and after reservation. Further details on construction of the treatment and control
group are provided in Section C.
1.6.1 Summary Statistics: Village Averages
Table B.1 presents baseline village averages for treated and untreated constituen-
cies, from the 2001 Census of India. There are, on average, 10 villages in each
constituency. As Table B.1 makes clear, constituencies in the treatment and control
groups do not differ significantly across a battery of characteristics including popu-
lation, literacy, employment or fraction of young. Treated constituencies had an SC
population of 21% in 2001 as opposed to 19 % in untreated constituencies. Illiteracy
in to-be-reserved constituencies was 53% in 2001 in both treated and never-reserved
constituencies. Unemployment was 47% in to-be-reserved constituencies and 48%
in never-reserved constituencies.
1.6.2 Summary Statistics: Constituency Averages
Panel A of Table B.2 presents baseline constituency-level electoral characteristics
for treated and untreated constituencies. To-be-reserved constituencies had fewer
candidates from right-wing or centre and centre-left parties among all candidates
contesting the election, but did not differ significantly in the victory rates of left-
wing or right-wing parties9. There are also no significant differences in gender
representation: 5% of all candidates (and 3% of all winners) in to-be-reserved con-
stituencies in 2003 and 2004 were female, versus 6% of all candidates (and 3% of
9In addition to the Communist Party of India and splinter groups, I class India’s oldest political
party (The Indian National Congress) and its offshoots as Left/Centre-Left.“Lower-Caste”parties are
those whose manifestoes or rhetoric are directed towards those at the bottom of the caste hierarchy.
In practice, this is effectively one party: the Bahujan Samaj Party, or the Party of the Oppressed
Majority.
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winners) in untreated constituencies10.
Panel B of Table B.2 presents constituency-level electoral characteristics after
treatment for treated and untreated characteristics. In 2008, to-be-reserved con-
stituencies had fewer candidates from right-wing or left/centre-left parties, but 23%
more winning candidates came from right-wing parties in treated constituencies,
and (unsurprisingly enough) 20% fewer of the winning candidates came from left-
wing parties.
Table B.3 presents constituency-level averages of the dependent variables for
to-be-reserved and never-reserved constituencies. There are no significant differ-
ences between the treatment and control groups prior to reservation over any of
the dependent variables. Turnout in 2008 was seven percentage points lower in re-
served constituencies compared to never-reserved constituencies. Right-wing can-
didates made 63% of winners in constituencies reserved in 2008, versus 41% in
never-reserved constituencies. The bottom panel presents differences in differences
for the four dependent variables. The change in turnout was six percentage points
lower in reserved constituencies. The share of right-wing winners rose by 11% in
reserved constituencies, and fell by 16% in never-reserved constituencies.
We might be concerned that the differences-in-differences that we observe with
the victory of right-wing candidates are driven entirely by changes coming from the
control group, rather than the treatment group. However, right-wing candidates
made up 2% fewer of winning candidates in all SC constituencies moving from 2003
or 2004 to 2008; 26% fewer of all winning candidates in ST constituencies, and 5%
fewer of all winning candidates in all nonreserved constituencies. Right-wing par-
ties, therefore, were less successful in 2008 than in 2003 or 2004 everywhere but in
to-be-reserved constituencies.
10It is possible that to-be-reserved constituencies would have significantly more or fewer minority
candidates. Unfortunately, the SC/ST status of candidates in unreserved constituencies only appears
in the data from 2004. The state of Karnataka has caste data for candidates from 2004 onwards. 9%
of candidates in to-be-reserved constituencies were SCs, versus 5% in never-reserved constituencies.
The difference is not significantly different from zero.
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1.7 Results: Aggregate
1.7.1 Basic Results
In Table B.4 I present the results from estimating equation 1.1. From Panel A of
column 3 of Table B.4, turnout in reserved constituencies after treatment drops by 6
percentage points relative to a baseline of 69 percentage points i.e. turnout falls by
9%. This result is robust to district fixed effects and a set of controls including aver-
age female literacy in 2001 and average 2001 unemployment. Turnout is positively
correlated with the POST dummy i.e. being in a year after treatment, but the effect
is small and the partial effect of reservation is still large, negative and significant.
As we see from columns 3 and 4 of Panel B of Table B.4, being in a reserved con-
stituency after treatment has a positive correlation with the ratio of candidates to
electors: being in a reserved constituency after reservation causes the ratio of candi-
dates to electors to rise by 8%. The effect is not precisely estimated, but reservation
has no discernible negative impact on this measure of electoral competition.From
Panel C of Table B.4, being in a treated constituency after reservation is positively
correlated with the margin of victory: the point estimate is 3 percentage points rel-
ative to a baseline of ten percentage points. However, the effect is imprecisely es-
timated11. As we see from Panel A of Table B.5, the probability that the winning
candidate is from a right-wing party is 26% higher in a reserved constituency after
reservation. Suggestively, the probability of victory of ”lower-caste” parties is lower
in the treated sample after treatment (as we see in Panel C), but the effect cannot be
disentangled from mean reversion.
There is also the question of exit: to argue that reservation causes turnout to
drop, we ought also to consider the reverse: whether turnout rises when a con-
stituency always reserved for SCs gets unreserved. Table B.6 considers constituen-
11As I outlined earlier, owing to their concentration, the sample of constituencies that are narrowly
reserved or left unreserved for STs is very small, so the presence or absence of effects is difficult to
argue. However, while widening the cutoff to 5 or 10 percentage points has no large impact on the
size of the effect of SC reservation on turnout, the point estimates of the difference-in-difference in
ST constituencies (not reported) is consistently small and not significantly different from zero
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cies unreserved (with control group identified as in Section 1.4), and shows that
turnout rises by 4 percentage points (relative to a baseline of 67 percentage points).
The ratio of candidates to electors rises by 43% (whereas in constituencies newly
reserved for SCs, the impact on this measure of electoral competition is not different
from zero), while, as with constituencies newly SC-reserved, dereservation is not
associated with a significant change in the margin of victory.
The bottom panel considers the fraction of winning candidates coming from
right-wing, left-wing and lower-caste parties in constituencies newly reserved and
newly-unreserved. While right-wing candidates make up a significantly higher frac-
tion of winners in newly-reserved constituencies, no group seems to win signifi-
cantly more often in newly-unreserved constituencies.
1.7.2 Robustness Checks
In this section I consider relaxing some of the restrictions in my specifications.
Currently, constituencies are categorized as treated or untreated if their SC popu-
lation is within 3 percentage points above or below the district cutoff described in
Section 1.4; the choice of specification leaves room for the possibility that some dis-
tricts will have only treated or untreated constituencies. Further, there are concerns
endemic to work using Difference-in-Difference specifications: serial correlation of
standard errors, prior trends and possible endogeneity of treatment (Bertrand, Du-
flo, and Mullainathan (2004)). The dependent variables that I examine (turnout,
electoral competition and the probability of success of right-wing parties) are quite
likely highly subject to serial correlation. However, in my data at present the time-
series dimension is less likely to be an issue: for each constituency, I consider the
election period prior to reservation, and the election year after reservation. The
method of selection of control groups also indicates that endogeneity of treatment
is less likely to be a concern. Furthermore, work examining Delimitation indicates
that constituency boundaries, where redrawn, were done so solely in order to en-
sure equal electorate sizes, with no evident bias, partisan or otherwise (Iyer and
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Shivakumar (2009)). This leaves the matter of prior trends.
1.7.2.1 Placebo Checks
Table B.7 presents results for turnout, the ratio of candidates to electors and the
margin of victory for the sample, but as though reservation were carried out in 1998
rather than 2008. Since for 5 constituencies no analogue exists prior to 2001, I present
my main results with and without these constituencies (columns 1 and 2 respec-
tively). Column 3 runs a placebo for the main specification and illustrates that being
in a treated constituency after 1998 has no significant impact on turnout or electoral
competition. This may go some way toward allaying concerns of prior trends.
Table B.8 indicates that the results suggesting that right-wing parties win dis-
proportionately often in newly-reserved constituencies is not echoed in the sample
constituencies with a placebo treatment carried out one decade prior to reservation.
1.7.2.2 Widening the sample
The results in Table B.4 are also robust to widening the sample to include hitherto-
unreserved constituencies with an SC population within 5 percentage points of the
district cutoff(see B.9) 12.
1.7.2.3 Districts with both Treated and Untreated Constituencies
In Table B.10, I restrict the sample to only districts which have both treated and
untreated constituencies. This constraint, perhaps unsurprisingly, is hard on the
data: almost half the observations are lost, leaving 120 observations. The main re-
sults are left unaffected, however: turnout falls by 5% in reserved constituencies
after reservation, and the ratio of candidates to electors is positively correlated with
being in a reserved constituency after reservation. So, too, is the margin of victory,
but the point estimate is small and the impact is not significantly different from zero
(see B.10).
12I am left with very few observations if I tighten the sample to only those constituencies within 1
percentage point of the district cutoff. However, the magnitude of effect is very similar.
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1.8 Individual-level Voting
In this section I present individual post-poll survey data for 15 constituencies in
one state in the sample. In 2008, an organisation called Lokniti carried out surveys
for a random selection of constituencies after the 2008 State Legislative Assembly
Elections, on behalf of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS). Re-
spondents were asked whether they voted in the most recent legislative assembly
elections (in 2008), whether they voted in the prior elections (in 2004), as well as
about current literacy, asset ownership, gender and ethnic group (religion, subcaste
and classification into SC, ST or otherwise).
Karnataka has 224 constituencies in the state legislative assembly, of which Lokniti
polls 75. Within these constituencies, I look for those meeting the criteria specified
in 1.4. This leaves me with 15 constituencies, of which 6 were reserved for the first
time in 2008, and 9 remain unreserved.
I regress the probability of voting (VOT) for individual i in constituency c in year
y on the incidence of being in a constituency reserved in 2008 (RE) after reservation
(POST) and their interaction; and the effect of being female and/or a minority and
being in a reserved constituency after treatment (ID·RE·POST). I estimate the fol-
lowing equations (in spirit very similar to the previous specification):
VOTicy = αˆ0 + αˆ1REc + αˆ2POSTy + αˆ3REc · POSTy + eicy (1.2)
VOTicy = βˆ0 + βˆ1REc + βˆ2POSTy + βˆ3REc · POSTy + βˆ4 IDic + (1.3)
βˆ5 IDic · REc + βˆ6 IDic · POSTy + βˆ7 IDic · REc · POSTy + uicy
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1.8.1 Summary Statistics for Lokniti Constituencies: Respondent
Characteristics in 2008
I filter out respondents who cannot remember whether they voted in 2008 or
2004, as well as respondents who were too young (or otherwise ineligible) to vote in
2004 or 2008. This leaves me with 405 respondents from treated constituencies, and
497 from untreated constituencies. As we see from Table B.11, untreated and treated
constituencies do not vary significantly across a range of respondent characteristics:
the fraction of SC respondents in treated constituencies is 16% and 15% in untreated
constituencies; the fraction of all sizable minorities (SC/ST/Muslim/Christian) is
29% in treated constituencies versus 33% in untreated. Women make up 49% of
respondents in treated constituencies versus 42% in untreated constituencies (not
significantly different at 10%). Literacy, monthly income and assets ownership too
did not vary significantly across treated and untreated constituencies. One-fifth of
those polled in untreated constituencies (16% in treated constituencies) responded
“Never”to the questions “How often do you read the newspaper?”;“How often do
you listen to the news on radio?”and “How often do you watch the news on televi-
sion?”, but the difference between treated and untreated constituencies was small.
Since we are left with 6 reserved and 9 unreserved constituencies, it is difficult
to argue that there are or are not systematic differences between the treated and
control group. However, village-level averages from the 2001 Census (out of 1420
villages across treated constituencies and 1827 in untreated constituencies) indicate
that to-be-reserved constituencies have an SC population of 25% as opposed to 21%
in untreated constituencies (see Table B.12), and an ST population of 6% versus 8%
in untreated constituencies, but the difference is not significant. The only charac-
teristic which varies significantly across treatment and control groups is the female
population, and even there the difference is small: 50% in treated versus 49% in
untreated constituencies. Similarly, since the number of candidates is small for this
reduced sample, it is difficult to confidently argue that the groups are or are not
identical. As Table B.13 indicates, reservation leaves 52 candidates in constituencies
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reserved in 2008, 59 for those remaining unreserved. It should be noted, though,
that 7 candidates out of 52 in to-be-reserved constituencies were SC, versus 3 out of
59 in never-reserved constituencies. The fraction of candidates from various party
types does not vary considerably across treatment and control groups.
1.8.2 Results: Individual Voting Data
Table B.14 presents results for the Linear Probability Model and Probit estimates
of equation 1.2 to 1.313. From column 2 , it appears that the probability of voting
falls in reserved constituencies after reservation relative to the baseline, by about
4% on average, although the effect is imprecisely estimated. From columns 4 and 5,
we see that female voters are 13% (in the Probit specification) to 15% (in the LPM
specification) less likely to vote in reserved constituencies after treatment relative
to the baseline. Columns 6 to 9 each have different definitions of the term ”minor-
ity”. Columns 6 and 7 examine the impact of being an SC or another minority and
interacting that with the incidence of being in a reserved constituency after reserva-
tion, and columns 8 and 9 lump together any individual who is not an upper-caste
Hindu. Minorities are between 9% (as in columns 8 and 9) and 20% (as in columns 6
and 7) less likely to vote in reserved constituencies after treatment, with the baseline
group of local elites showing no significant change in voter participation. Columns
10 to 13 discuss the effects of controlling both for being female and in a reserved con-
stituency after treatment, and belonging to a minority group and being in a reserved
constituency after treatment. The base group (of male elites) shows no significant
difference in voter participation, while being female reduces voter participation by
about 15% relative to the baseline, and belonging to a minority community reduces
voter participation between 10% (as in columns 12 and 13) and 20% (as in columns
10 and 11).
The data used is taken from a survey in 2008 asking only one retrospective ques-
13Since reservation is at the constituency level, and there are only 15 constituencies in the sample,
clustering standard errors at constituency level seems problematic. However, the following results
are qualitatively very similar using robust standard errors or a block bootstrap approach. I present
here the most conservative of my observed results.
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tion. This is not so much a concern for intrinsic characteristics such as gender or
ethnic group, but controls such as monthly income, asset ownership and years of
education do vary over time. However, it seems reasonable to assume that a re-
spondent who was illiterate in 2008 was similarly so in 2004. Columns 14 and 15 of
table B.14 suggest that illiterate respondents in treated constituencies in 2008 were 5
% less likely to vote. The effect, however, is imprecisely estimated.
Columns 16 and 17 of table B.14 suggest that uninformed respondents (who re-
sponded ”never” to how often they consumed news in various media) in treated
constituencies in 2008 were not significantly less likely to vote than informed coun-
terparts. However, respondents were asked about their information acquisition in
2008 only.
1.8.3 Magnitude of Effects
“Back-of-the-envelope”calculations suggest that in the Probit estimation (speci-
fication as in column 5), the predicted probability that the base group of males votes
in a reserved constituency after reservation is 94%, whereas that of females is 72%.
Using a similar procedure, we see that being in an SC constituency immediately
after reservation does not affect the participation of the base group of elites, while
being a minority lowers participation by 14% (columns 7 and 9). In column 11, be-
ing female in a treated constituency after treatment reduces an agent’s probability
of voting by 18%, and the reduction is by 19% in column 13. In column 13, being a
minority reduces voter participation in a treated constituency after treatment by 9%
and in column 11, by between 9% and 12%. Controlling for being a minority in a
treated constituency after treatment, being female reduces participation by between
30% and 32% in column 11 and 31% in column 13. Controlling for being female
in a treated constituency after treatment, being a minority reduces voter participa-
tion by between 26% and 30% in column 11 and 22% in column 13. From Table B.14,
one sees that these magnitudes are qualitatively similar to (though usually bounded
below by) those in the LPM specifications.
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1.8.4 Interpretation
I consider possible interpretations of the results in Table B.14, and relate them to
the theoretical predictions regarding turnout in Section 1.2.3.
1.8.4.1 Competition
From Section 1.2.3.1, we should expect that if reservation affects turnout through
its impact on competition, we should expect electoral competition and turnout to go
in the same direction.
Since electoral competition (as measured by the margin of victory or ratio of
candidates to electors) did not significantly alter as a result of reservation, this does
not seem the best explanation.
1.8.4.2 Expressive Voting
From Section 1.2.3.2, were this to be the explanation, we would see participation
drop across all ethnic groups, including those of local elites.
Represented minorities, however, show no significant change in voting behaviour,
and neither do nonminority voters, the latter result ruling out at least a simple dis-
enfranchisement explanation.
1.8.4.3 Information
From Section 1.2.3.3, if reservation affects turnout primarily through its impact
on information, one would expect uninformed voters to disproportionately partici-
pate less after reservation.
Although respondents who were “uninformed”in 2008 did not vote significantly
less as a result of reservation, it is still suggestive that women and minorities are sig-
nificantly likelier to respond that they never get the news (through any medium).
28% of female voters (as opposed to 10% of male voters) were “uninformed”i.e., in
2008, responded that they never read newspapers, listened to the news on the radio,
or watched it on TV. Respondents who were female, or belonged to a minority, were
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uninformed by this definition 26% of the time, whereas male nonminority respon-
dents were only uninformed 12% of the time, the difference statistically significant.
If candidate ethnic group is a proxy for information about candidate characteris-
tics,it is quite possible that if all candidates share the same broad ethnic group, a
major source of information is lost.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper joins the debate on the merits of political reservation with a note on
its impact on political participation and electoral competition, and does not support
claims that mandated minority representation reduces competition. However, voter
participation drops in constituencies with restricted candidate identity. Evidence
from a subsample indicates that mandated minority representation may reduce par-
ticipation for women and for minority groups.
Further work will consider testing for common trends using previous Census
data for the sample constituencies. It would also consider sample extension, since
five other states carried out elections in 2011. Four of these states are the populous
Assam, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal. The wider sample (once released)
may enable us to observe the impact of reservation of constituencies for Scheduled
Tribes, a task so far rendered impossible by the limitations of the existing sample.
In addition, the most recent round of delimitation took place in 2008, so I can only
observe constituencies immediately after treatment, and for one election year im-
mediately prior to treatment. Further work would examine whether the impact on
turnout that I observe continues. Lastly, a theoretical extension might look at the im-
pact of electoral systems: for instance, how does the First-Past-the-Post FPTP system
affect this outcome, as opposed to Proportional Representation?
43
Chapter 2
Why do Workers Remain in
Low-Paying Hereditary Occupations?
2.1 Introduction
Occupational rigidity has appeared in various forms all over the world, from
guilds in Mediaeval Western Europe to the caste system in India. These systems
differ along several dimensions, but they share the following features: recruitment
into occupations happens early (in the case of the caste system, at birth) and workers
remain in hereditary occupations, even when pay is low.
The case of the Indian caste system in particular has received a great deal of at-
tention, not least because of its persistence. Many persuasive theories have been
propounded to explain intergenerational occupational rigidity, ranging from the
difficulty of acquiring the human capital required to switch jobs (Bannerjee and
Newman (1993)), to the role of caste groups in minimizing information asymmetries
(Akerlof (1976), Greif (1993)) and thus lending themselves to contract enforcement
(Freitas (2006)) or social insurance (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009)).
This paper suggests that, in environments with limited or no contract enforce-
ment or insurance provision, occupational (or spatial) mobility is limited by the
insurance-provision function of networks- in the case of this paper, that of the fam-
ily. While occupational specialization by community (the caste, or jati1, in India, in
1The jati refers to a subcaste rather than a caste, which is usually considered the relevant unit in
the literature.
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particular) has been studied before (Akerlof (1976), Akerlof (1980)), this paper sug-
gests that insurance can generate intergenerational occupational rigidity(which is
frequently conjectured (Freitas (2006)) or assumed (Greif (1993)), but so far has not
been explicitly derived), as well as occupational specialization.
I use a two-period Overlapping Generations model in which a parent with an
endowment of occupation-specific human capital transfers costly human capital to
her offspring, in return for full insurance if the parent suffers an accident. If the off-
spring participates in the arrangement and insures her parent in case of an accident,
she can use the human capital passed on to her by her parent in the final period of
her life. If she defaults, she cannot use this and she and her descendants are barred
from the insurance arrangement.
I find that agents with low levels of human capital are more likely to participate
in the insurance arrangement, since their costs of training their offspring are lower.
As the cost of sickness rises, parents are willing to disseminate higher amounts of
specific human capital, and the highest sustainable human capital transfer rises with
the cost of sickness.
This paper unites two broad views of caste: a “functional”view, suggesting that
guilds, castes or professional associations are designed to protect intellectual prop-
erty or rents of any kind, and that of castes or trading associations as a corrective
of information-related market failures. The existing literature on castes as contract-
enforcement mechanisms or insurance providers tends to ignore this role, but there
is considerable evidence that castes functioned as professional associations. For one
thing, as with guilds, many caste surnames reflect ancestral occupations. Castes
were largely ascriptive as early as 303 B.C. (Blunt (1969)), and Indian mythology
contains several intriguing accounts of the role of the divine order in protecting pro-
prietary knowledge. For instance, one account of the first of the ten incarnations
of the preserver, Vishnu, begins with the theft of metaphysical knowledge from the
mouth of a sleeping Creator. The preserver, Vishnu, must retrieve the knowledge
before those who are not entitled to it can use it.
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This paper complements an extensive literature on occupationally-specialized
networks, from studies of the guild economy in mediaeval and early modern Eu-
rope (Ogilvie (2004)) to Colonial and modern India (Buhler (1886)), (M.N.Srinivas
(1962)). The Indian caste system has attracted much attention owing to its central-
ity in Indian politics (some of which is addressed in Chapter 1), the range of forces
used to change it, either legislative or economic, and its resilience in the face of these
forces.
Recent work by Banerjee, Bertrand, Datta, and Mullainathan (2009) examines
labour-market discrimination in the technology industry on the basis of caste and
religion, and finds no significant evidence of discrimination against lower-caste ap-
plicants. Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010) find that affirmative action in
education does not seem to adversely affect the perception of beneficiaries. How-
ever, endogamy seems to be more stubborn: Banerjee, Duflo, Ghatak, and Lafortune
(2009) show that a preference for partners of the same community persists even de-
spite urbanisation and economic growth.
There has long been an interest in the benefits of seemingly autocratic and in-
efficient institutions- from labour market access (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006),
Luke and Munshi (2006)) to access to credit and insurance (Munshi and Rosen-
zweig (2009), Townsend (1994), Chiappori, Samphantharak, Schulhofer-Wohl, and
Townsend (2011), Berman (2000)). A key part of these benefits comes from the role
of networks in enforcing co-operation absent formal contract enforcement (Akerlof
(1976), Akerlof (1980), Freitas (2006) and Greif (1993)). See also the literature on
group lending with joint liability (Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Ghatak (1999)).
It has also been understood that contractual responsibilities can be passed inter-
temporally, from generation to generation (for instance, Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)
indicates that labour contracts pass from father to son). While discussing the Maghribi
mercantile trading association of the mediaeval Middle East, Goitein (1973) observes
that sons followed their father’s occupations, and further defaults or obligations
were transferred to relatives or offspring (Goitein (1978)).
46
This paper belongs to the broader literature on the persistence of archaic insti-
tutions, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between dynastic human
capital and the provision of insurance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides some
brief background regarding hereditary occupations and the caste system, as well as
the Indian “joint family”(in which an extended family lives under the same roof)
and norms dictating parental care. Section 2.3 considers alternative explanations of
the phenomenon of extended families. Section 2.4 provides a simple model of in-
surance in which an agent transfers costly human capital to her offspring in return
for insurance in the event of an accident. Section 2.4.2 derives predictions for the
maximum human capital transfer that a parent is willing to make, and Section 2.4.3
shows the child’s problem, with Section 2.4.3.1 deriving predictions for the mini-
mum human capital transfer that a child is willing to accept for an interior solution.
Section 2.5 shows results for a numerical simulation of the baseline model. Section
2.6 concludes with some ideas for further work.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Caste in India: Ascriptive or not?
The word ”caste” comes from the Portuguese word ”casta”, meaning mould,
breed or race. The definition of what constitutes a ”caste” has mutated consider-
ably, but for the most part it is taken to mean an endogamous group of people who
observe (with varying degrees of strictness) rules pertaining to food, drink, work
(on which more later) and association with each other and those of other groups.
There is some doubt as to whether castes were designed primarily as units of
occupational specialization. Rules 96-99 of Chapter X of the Laws of Manu (Buh-
ler (1886)) are explicit about the dangers of assuming the functions of those castes
higher than one’s own: “A man of low caste who through covetousness lives by the
occupations of a higher one, the king shall deprive of his property and banish. It
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is better (to discharge) one’s own (appointed) duty incompletely than to perform
completely that of another; for he who lives according to the law of another (caste)
is instantly excluded from his own”.
However, rules 80-95 suggest that there is some latitude, provided that certain
“polluting”occupations are avoided. “Among the several occupations the most
commendable are, teaching the Veda for a Brahmana, protecting (the people) for a
Kshatriya, and trade for a Vaisya. But a Brahmana, unable to subsist by his peculiar
occupations just mentioned, may live according to the law applicable to Kshatriyas;
for the latter is next to him in rank. If it be asked, ’How shall it be, if he cannot
maintain himself by either (of these occupations?’ the answer is), he may adopt a
Vaisya’s mode of life, employing himself in agriculture and rearing cattle. But a
Brahmana, or a Kshatriya, living by a Vaisya’s mode of subsistence, shall carefully
avoid (the pursuit of) agriculture, (which causes) injury to many beings and de-
pends on others..... If he applies sesamum to any other purpose but food, anointing,
and charitable gifts, he will be born (again) as a worm and, together with his ances-
tors, be plunged into the ordure of dogs. By (selling) flesh, salt, and lac a Brahmana
at once becomes an outcast; by selling milk he becomes (equal to) a Sudra in three
days. But by willingly selling in this world other (forbidden) commodities, a Brah-
mana assumes after seven nights the character of a Vaisya.... A Kshatriya who has
fallen into distress, may subsist by all these (means); but he must never arrogantly
adopt the mode of life (prescribed for his) betters”.
However, occupational specialization and intergenerational occupational rigid-
ity are frequently associated with castes, and there is considerable evidence that
castes functioned as professional associations, in which recruitment happened at
birth. Blunt (1969) notes that Megasthenes, on a visit to India in 303 B.C, observed
that “No one is allowed to marry out of his own caste, or to exchange one profession
or trade for another, or to follow more than one business”.
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2.2.2 The Joint Family
Almost three quarters of all the rural elderly in India live with their children, and
it is understood that responsibility for the care of an ailing and aged parent falls to
the child. Karve (1953) suggests that even in 1000 B.C., the joint family (”a group of
people who generally live under one roof, who eat food cooked in one kitchen, who
hold property in common, participate in common family worship and are related to
one another as some particular type of kindred.”) existed in a similar form to that
understood today. Members of the same extended family frequently live in the same
residence. Karve (1953) notes that parents lived with married sons, and up to four
generations lived under the same roof.
2.2.2.1 Filial Responsibility
Cultural norms dictate that responsibility for caring for the elderly parent rests
with the (usually male) child. Primary Vedic texts state, for instance, ”Matru Devo
Bhava”, ”Pitru Devo Bhava”, which mean ”venerate your mother and father as you
would God”. Chapter 8 of the Mahanirvana Tantra (or ”Spiritual System of Great
Liberation”), from a translation by Woodroffe (1976) states that “The man who, to
the deprivation of his elders ....., fills his own belly is despised in this world, and
goes to Hell in the next”; “He who becomes an ascetic, leaving mothers, fathers,
infant children, wives, agnates and cognates, is guilty of a great sin”; “The body is
nourished by the mother. It originates from the father. The kinsmen, out of love,
teach. The man, therefore, who forsakes them is indeed vile”.
In Chapter III of the Laws of Manu (translation by Buhler (1886)) is prescribed
the banning from sacred rituals ”he who forsakes his mother, his father or teacher”
(Rule 157) and ”he who wrangles or goes to law with his father” (Rule 160). Further,
in Chapter XI, the sins leading to a loss of caste include ”casting off ones teacher,
mother, father, or son.... selling... one’s wife, or child... casting off a relative”. This
is a serious penalty, as it means not only social ostracism for the offender, but also
an inability to practise his occupation.
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There were also sanctions against travel, particularly foreign travel. Interest-
ingly these seemed to apply to agents from higher rather than lower castes. Hutton
(1961) notes that ”One restriction on Hindus.....applies, or used to apply, with much
greater force to higher than to lower castes, and that is the prohibition against going
overseas”. Insofar as high-caste agents may be said to have higher human capi-
tal than lower-caste agents, this may reflect stronger attempts to preclude parental
abandonment by children with substantial human capital.
2.2.2.2 Parental Responsibility
On parental duties Chapter 8 of the Mahanirvana Tantra says of the householder:
“A father should fondle and nurture his sons until their fourth year, and then until
their sixteenth they should be taught learning and their duties”. This rather milder
injunction seems born of greater anxiety regarding filial misbehaviour than that of
parents. One explanation for this is that parents are altruistic towards children and
not vice versa, and another is that children could commit less to caring for parents
than the other way around.
In the following section, I lay out a simple model of insurance in which agents
accumulate human capital to transmit to their offspring in return for care in the
event of sickness. But first I consider in more detail some alternative explanations
of the phenomenon of filial responsibility for parental care in developing countries.
2.3 Altruism, Asset Poverty or Insurance
One simple explanation for the coresidence of elderly parents with children is
that of altruism: i.e. parents wish to maximize their children’s utility and children
care about their parent’s utility. However, were this the case, it is difficult to explain
retention of children in low-paying hereditary occupations2. Moreover, there are
documented instances of recent abandonment of or cruelty towards aging parents,
leading the Parliament of India to pass the “Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
2It is also tempting to suggest that there would be no need for specific prescriptions regarding the
care of kin if children or parents looked after each other without prompting.
50
and Senior Citizens Act”in 2007, which creates provisions for the punishment of
children who abandon or neglect parents dependant on them.
Another persuasive explanation frequently offered is that of asset-poverty in the
presence of indivisible human capital investments and capital market imperfections
a la Bannerjee and Newman (1993) i.e. parents and children cannot afford to invest
in the human capital necessary to move out of traditional occupations. However,
there is evidence indicating that even when parents can afford to give a child costly
education, the child expected to care for the parent still remains in the traditional
occupation.
2.3.1 Traditional Occupations and Parental Reponsibility
As Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) show in a study of occupational choice by
gender in a community in Western India, it was male children who received net-
work benefits and were discouraged from seeking occupational choices that would
weaken the network, and who thus could not benefit from the increased return
to outside occupational choices, even when the parents could afford to send their
daughters to costlier schools with higher wage returns to education.
Part of the common wisdom behind a preference for sons in developing coun-
tries like China and India is that responsibility for caring for elderly parents lies with
sons, whereas daughters cannot be relied on to look after aged parents (the scrip-
tural prescriptions described earlier apply specifically to male householders.). The
phenomenon was also observed elsewhere: while discussing the Maghribi mercan-
tile trading association of the mediaeval Middle East, Goitein (1973) observes that
fathers regarded sons as their “insurance policies”. In India, 60% of elderly people
live with male children 3.
Thus asset poverty alone cannot explain why children are retained in low-paying
hereditary occupations. This suggests a form of intertemporal exchange, in which
3Karve (1953) points out that in the south Indian state of Kerala, we observe that married women
live with their mothers. We will consider the phenomenon observed in other Indian states of kinship
through male ancestors.
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dynastic capital is transmitted to the child expected to care for the elderly parent4.
2.3.2 Family, Caste and Insurance
Finally, in India, especially in rural areas, family networks are still the largest
source of insurance (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009))- informal loans from family
members make up a higher fraction of loans than from friends or employers. A
commonly cited reason for this is that caste or jati networks have informational
advantages- I.R.Dave (1976) says of a premodern Indian trading association “[They
were] very keen to stick to truth in their dealings”. Further, they “seldom bor-
row[ed] from other than their castemen”(A.J.Saunders (1920–1922)). Hutton (1961),
when describing the functions of caste, says that “[an individual caste member’s
caste] acts as his trade union, his friendly or benefit society, his health insurance,
and if need be provides for his funeral”.
There is extensive anecdotal evidence suggesting that members of the same caste
were in an excellent position to know each other’s doings either through frequent
social interaction or by living with or in close quarters to each other. Members of
the same jati traditionally lived in close quarters. As E.R.Leach (1960) notes, ”The
Brahmans exhibit a high degree of internal interaction and external exclusiveness.
As kinsfolk, they invite each other to feasts... initiations, marriage, death and ances-
tral rites.. Houses are built with walls adjoining; holes in the walls permit women
to pass messages to each other. Children are socialized within the street and until
the age of five do not mingle with those of other castes”.
Assuming that information flows more effectively in small communities, one
should expect that (i) as the size of a caste increases, it should split in order to more
effectively monitor its members and (ii) as families increase in size, they should split
into different units. In Freitas (2006) one sees for South Indian castes between 1823
and 1941 that there is a positive correlation between the number of distinct jatis and
population size. Anthropological surveys from Karve (1953) suggest that as family
4This implies, in turn, that if a parent had more than one son the son expected to care for the
parent would be likelier to receive ancestral capital.
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sizes increase, extended families split and move into different residences. ”Every
existing joint family is a piece broken off from a larger unit.” ”the northern family
often breaks up at the death of the man who first founded it. When such a family
splits and there is partition....into smaller joint families made up of a man, his wife
and children , son’s sons and daughters; or a man, his wife and children and a
couple of younger brothers who wish to have his protection or who may not be old
enough to take care of themselves.”
Rural justice frequently devolves upon Caste Councils or Jati Panchayats, who
were observed to have an excellent sense of the truth of matters. Hutton (1961)
says that “Caste panchayats [councils] will generally be very much more likely to
know the true facts of offences their castemen have committed than the ordinary
law courts are”. He also notes the importance of small localities in the transmission
of information: “The caste council can only act for a limited area, an area small
enough ... for members of the caste within the area to have some knowledge of each
other as a general rule”. Blunt (1969) observes something similar: “There is not one
panchayat only to each endogamous group, but one panchayat to each independent
local section of the group”.
It seems reasonable to expect, thus, that the dynastic capital transmitted to the
child is frequently tied to a specific location, where the social network can relay
information about its members.
I propose an explanation that ties together the following observed phenomena:
(i) hereditary occupations- specifically those where male offspring use the family’s
dynastic capital; (ii) coresidence of parents with sons; (iii) the informational advan-
tages of local, occupationally specialized networks. How did parents induce their
children to remain nearby in order to smooth consumption when older? By provid-
ing them with training that would be useless if they travelled far away, or remained
in the same area without abiding by the terms of the social contract.
To this end, I derive a simple model of insurance in which agents keep children in
hereditary occupations by passing on human capital, and in which children remain
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in hereditary occupations so as to have specific human capital to pass on.
2.4 Model
It is difficult, when drawing on historical records, sociological documents and re-
ligious law to make inferences about social practice, to judge the use of assumptions.
Does the author stick to only those are assumptions which are directly borne out by
the text, or may she use those which are not directly contradicted by her sources?
Similarly, how is she to use historical record when evaluating her findings?
I will use anecdotal evidence from historical records or anthropological surveys
to either back up assumptions (and attempt to make as few as possible assumptions
that do not seem directly indicated by accounts of common practice), and to support
the claims that I make. A note on my use of scriptural sources: I will frequently be
using the existence of prescribed sanctions or punishments in scripture not only as
evidence that such activities carried a cost if discovered, but also as evidence that
agents had an incentive to misbehave without the threat of a punishment.
2.4.1 Model Setup
In this model, each agent lives and consumes in two periods of life: Child (C)
and parent (P). In the first period, the child works for her parent, who gives the
child costly human capital which is only valuable if used locally, in return for full
coverage if the parent is sick. If the child insures her parent, she can use her human
capital as a parent to get insurance from her child. If she does not insure her parent,
she is not allowed to use her human capital by the network of practitioners of the
same occupation; thus, her human capital is worthless. Further, she is not permitted
to use the insurance arrangement.
The model is timed as follows: in Period 1, the parent transfers costly human
capital to the child. After the parent makes her choice of human capital transmis-
sion, she and her child find out whether the parent is sick and (if the parent chose
insurance) the child decides whether to make a transfer to the parent. The parent
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dies at the end of Period 1.
At the beginning of Period 2, the child is now a parent with her own child. If
the parent was sick at the end of Period 1, it is revealed whether the child insured
the parent honestly. If she did, she is allowed to use her human capital, and must
choose whether to seek insurance by transmitting h′′ to her own child, or autarky.
If not, she is not allowed to practise the occupation in which she was trained, and
is barred from the insurance arrangement. Then the child discovers whether she is
sick, and if she has chosen insurance her offspring must choose whether to insure
her. The child dies at the end of Period 2.
In each period, the parent has a probability of sickness pi. This pi is drawn inde-
pendently in each period. If the agent is sick she incurs a disutility I. If the parent
chooses not to get insurance she has the use of the entirety of her human capital f (h).
If she chooses to get insurance, the parent with human capital f (h) transfers to her
child human capital h′ with time cost c(h′), yielding human capital worth f (h′) to
the child. Thus the parent is left with f (h)(1− c(h′)). This time cost captures the
idea that training cost increases in not only the value of human capital imparted to
the child, but also in the value of the parent’s own human capital, which suggests a
motive for retention of workers in low-paying occupations.
If the parent does not fall sick the child has the use of human capital f (h′) in
Period 1 and in period 2. If the parent falls sick and the child insures her parent,
she makes a transfer θ I when the parent falls sick, leaving the child with f (h′)− θ I.
θ < 1 i.e. the child’s cost of caring for the parent is increasing in, but lower than, the
parent’s disutility from sickness. If the child insures her parent, she has the use of
human capital f (h′) in Period 2, otherwise, she cannot practise the occupations in
which she was trained and her human capital is worth 0.
A key assumption here is that information flows perfectly within the family, and
further that practitioners of the same occupation know with certainty whether the
child insured or cheated the parent. This seems reasonable- as Hutton (1961) and
others have stated, the jati or biradari possessed accurate information as to the rights
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and wrongs of a matter, and of each other’s concerns.
The assumption that the child cannot practise her occupation and remain in the
area is suggested by the practice of outcasteing unfilial children (Buhler (1886)). As
mentioned before, the penalty of outcasteing was indeed the prescribed one for chil-
dren who neglected their filial duties. Outcasteing can be regarded as either a refusal
to let the offender ply her trade, or by imposing sanctions so severe as to nullify the
value of her human capital.
I assume that the human capital that the child possesses cannot be used if she
migrates- tantamount to saying that she cannot practise her trade where she is not
known. Hindu law and custom regarding commensality or trade with mleccha or
aliens was well understood. Bougle (1971) notes “To eat with, or even in the pres-
ence of, a stranger, or worse, to eat food that he has touched, are so many unpar-
donable sins”.
I assume implicitly that agents care only about their own utility- the issue of
bequests or a desire to maximize one’s descendants’ consumption is not addressed
here. I abstract from inheritance of property or money in this paper- a parent has
only her own human capital to transmit to her child, and her child cannot obtain
occupation-specific human capital elsewhere. The only insurance contract I con-
sider currently has full coverage- the child’s transfer comprehends the entirety of
the parent’s disutility owing to sickness. Further, there is no technology, obsoles-
cence of human capital or uncertainty about the value of human capital i.e. agents
know that human capital worth f (h) in Period 1 will continue to be so in Period 2.
For analytical convenience, I assume that children have no human capital of their
own and that all agents have the same concave (with convex inverse) utility func-
tion5 u(.),u(0) = 0. Throughout I assume that agents have the same discount factor,
0 < β < 1. I assume a convex time cost (with a concave inverse) of transmitting
human capital c(h′), and a weakly concave function of human capital transmitted
5This is made for convenience so that we can pin down the minimum and maximum human
capital that parents pass on to children. However, this procedure can be done if we assume that
agents have perfect information of their descendants’ preferences, and that a child’s utility function
can be expressed as an increasing and monotonic transformation of that of her parent.
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(i.e. f (h′) > h′, f ′(h′) > 0, f ′′(h′) ≤ 0).
I wish to examine why agents remain in low-paying hereditary occupations, us-
ing the lens of occupation-specific human capital as a means of insurance. Thus it
is of interest to consider the cost of insurance, and the benefit of insurance over au-
tarky. The first is captured by the time cost of human capital transmission to the
child (increasing in the parent’s own human capital), and the latter is captured by
the cost of sickness- i.e. the disutility I. The following section examines the highest
sustainable human capital transfer by the parent as a function of the cost of sickness
I and the value of parental human capital h.
2.4.2 The Parent’s Problem
In each period, the parent chooses her human capital transfer to maximize her
utility, subject to feasibility and the child’s incentive compatibility constraint. The
parent has two alternatives in the final period of her life: autarky and insurance.
Autarky for the parent yields u( f (h))with probability 1−pi and−I with probability
pi, and choosing insurance yields u( f (h)(1− c(h′))).
The parent’s surplus over autarky is unambiguously declining in human capital
transfer to the child h′. Thus the maximum human capital that the parent is willing
to transfer to the child is such that she is indifferent between autarky and insurance
subject to feasibility i.e.:
u( f (h)(1− c(h¯))) = (1− pi)u( f (h))− pi I. (2.1)
subject to:
h¯ ≥ 0
c(h¯) ≤ 1
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i.e.
h¯ = min{c−1(1), max{0, c−1[1− 1
f (h)
· u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]}} (2.2)
Where c−1[1− 1/ f (h) · u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)] is defined, and
h¯ = 0 (2.3)
Otherwise. From this I can derive some baseline predictions regarding the max-
imum sustainable human capital, namely:
2.4.2.1 Results: Maximum Human Capital Transferred by Parent
Proposition 1. The maximum human capital that the parent is willing to transfer to her
child (h¯) is increasing and concave in the disutility owing to sickness (I) .
Proposition 2. The maximum human capital that the parent is willing to transfer to her
child (h¯) is increasing and concave in the probability of sickness (pi) .
From 2.1, one sees that the parent’s surplus over autarky rises in pi and in I. In-
tuitively, as the expected cost of sickness rises, ceteris paribus, the surplus to the
parent over autarky rises as well i.e. as the disutility from sickness rises, the ben-
efit to insuring rises and the maximum human capital that the parent will impart
increases. For a proof, see Sections D.1 and D.2.
Proposition 3. The maximum human capital that the parent is willing to transfer to her
child (h¯) is nonincreasing in her own human capital (h) i.e. ∂h¯∂h ≤ 0.
Intuitively, any increase in the parent’s own human capital raises her cost of
imparting human capital to her child as well. Thus, ceteris paribus, the maximum
human capital that the parent is willing to disseminate cannot be increasing in h.
This suggests that parents with lower human capital are likelier to participate in the
insurance arrangement. For a proof, see Section D.3.
Note that this along with Proposition 1 suggests that as the cost of sickness rises,
parents with higher and higher human capital will choose to participate in the in-
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surance arrangement i.e. as the cost of sickness rises, the benefit to the parent over
autarky outweighs her cost of imparting human capital.
Proposition 3 indicates a reason for the retention of workers in low-paying hered-
itary occupations- as the cost of human capital transmission increases in the training
imparted to the child as well as the parent’s own human capital, parents with low
human capital will impart more training to their offspring.
Were this to be true, one would expect that the dissemination of dynastic cap-
ital should be seen primarily in low-human-capital occupations. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that kin-based or community-based social or labour networks are
indeed more prevalent in such occupations. Several observers have noted that in-
formational networks seem to have greater efficacy among the lower castes. Mun-
shi and Rosenzweig (2006), too, suggest that labour networks are seen more in the
case of low-human-capital occupations. The primacy of caste councils in adjudi-
cating disputes in early Modern India seemed “practically confined to the lower
castes”(O’Malley (1968)). D.N.Majumdar (1958), in a study of a North Indian vil-
lage, states that ”every caste has its own panchayat, or biradari[brotherhood], though
this is not as fully recognised among the high castes as it is among the lower castes”.
Hutton (1961) notes for Northern Indian castes that “..the lower a caste in the social
scale, the stronger its combination, and the more efficient its organisation”.
The cost is recognized obliquely in scripture as well- men who turn their backs
on a life of asceticism forego considerable spiritual benefits, and the benefits are the
highest for Brahmins, the highest-ranked of the “twice-born ”castes. In Chapter II
of the Laws of Manu, Rule 249 states that “A Brahmana who thus passes his life
as a student without breaking his vow, reaches (after death) the highest abode and
will not be born again in this world”. If higher-caste agents are considered to have
higher human capital, then this might suggest that the costs of assuming the duties
of a householder and passing on human capital to one’s offspring were considered
to increase in parental human capital.
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that as the cost of sickness increases i.e. the benefit
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of insurance increases, the highest insurance obtained by the parent will rise comen-
surately. Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are key to illustrating that the maximum sustainable
human capital transfer is increasing in the cost of sickness.
Since the transmission of human capital in this environment is done to acquire
insurance, this suggests that increased access to alternative means of insurance for
the elderly (whether through capital markets or through non-familial social means)
should, on average, depress retention of children in hereditary occupations. While
it is not explicitly modelled here, since I regard a failure of the child to insure her
parent as essentially parental abandonment, care of the parent goes hand-in-hand
with living with or near to the parent. Thus one should also expect that an increase
in access to insurance for the elderly should depress parent-child coresidence.
In the next section I consider the minimum acceptable human capital transfer by
the child.
2.4.3 The Child’s Problem
The child has three alternatives over the two periods of her life: insuring the
parent and choosing autarky in period 2; insuring the parent and getting insurance
from her child by transferring human capital h′′ and cheating, or not insuring the
parent6.
Recall that if the parent remains healthy in Period 1, the child has the use of
human capital f (h′) in both periods of her life. If the parent falls sick and the child
insures her, the child has f (h′)− θ I in Period 1 and the use of human capital f (h′) in
period 2. Thus the present discounted value of insuring the parent in period 1 and
choosing autarky next period is:
(1− pi)u( f (h′)) + piu( f (h′)− θ I) + β(1− pi)u( f (h′))− βpi · I (2.4)
6Since the child possesses no human capital of her own and her outside option is zero, cheating at
least weakly dominates refusing to participate at all levels of human capital. A positive reservation
utility can be built in by treating this problem as the child’s surplus utility from remaining to insure
the parent over leaving to get her reservation utility.
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Insuring the parent and getting insurance from her child yields:
(1− pi)u( f (h′)) + piu( f (h′)− θ I) + βu( f (h′)(1− c(h′′))) (2.5)
If the parent falls sick in Period 1 and the child does not insure her, the child has
human capital f (h′) in Period 1, but cannot use her human capital in period 2. Thus
not insuring the parent yields:
u( f (h′))− βpi · I (2.6)
The child will insure the parent honestly if the present discounted value of cheat-
ing the parent is no higher than the maximum presented discounted value of hon-
estly insuring the parent i.e. if:
u( f (h′))− βpi · I ≤ max{(1− pi)u( f (h′)) + piu( f (h′)− θ I)
+β(1− pi)u( f (h′))− βpi I,
(1− pi)u( f (h′)) + piu( f (h′)− I)
+βu( f (h′)(1− c(h′′)))}
∀h′′ ≤ h¯(h′)
The parent chooses h′ in each period to maximize her utility, subject to achiev-
ing at least her autarky utility, and subject to feasibility and satisfying her child’s
incentive compatibility constraints i.e.
U(h′) = max
h′
u( f (h(1− c(h′))
+µ{u( f (h(1− c(h′))− (1− pi)u( f (h)) + pi I}
+λ{max{(1− pi)u( f (h′)) + piu( f (h′)− θ I) + β(1− pi)u( f (h′))
−βpi I, (1− pi)u( f (h′)) + piu( f (h′)− I)
+βu( f (h′)(1− c(h′′)))} − u( f (h′)) + βpi · I}
+γ{h′}+ δ{1− c(h′)}
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In order to arrive at a set of sustainable human capital transfers for any cost of
sickness I, I assume stationarity and solve for a stationary equilibrium.
Stationary Equilibrium: An equilibrium is defined as a human capital transfer
h′ in any period at which the parent at least weakly prefers insurance at time cost
c(h′) to autarky, and the child at least weakly prefers insuring the parent to cheating.
Assuming that pi evolves independently in each time period and that the distribu-
tion of initial parental h is distributed independently of pi, we can characterize a set
of h′ sustainable in equilibrium for each cost of sickness I.
Assuming stationarity, I use the following procedure to characterize a set of sus-
tainable human capital transfers for any I : First, for every value of parental human
capital h I find the maximum human capital that a parent with human capital h will
offer: h¯. Next, for every value of the cost of sickness I, I check for h˜ which is the min-
imum human capital transfer7 at which a child will honestly insure a parent. For any
h, this yields [h˜, h¯]. The union of [h˜, h¯] across all h gives us the set of all sustainable
human capital transfers at I.
2.4.3.1 Minimum Human Capital Accepted by Child: Interior Stationary Solu-
tion
As derived above, h¯ increases with I. Regarding the relationship between h˜ and
I, one can say the following:
Proposition 4. If the constrained first-best was achieved for an interior solution (i.e. at
0 < h′ < c−1(1)), such that the child is indifferent between cheating and honestly insuring
the parent and choosing to insure at h′′ = h′, and if surplus over cheating at h′ = h′′ is
nondecreasing in h, ∂h
′
∂I > 0 .
Proposition 5. If the constrained first-best was achieved for an interior solution (i.e. at
0 < h′ < c−1(1)), such that the child is indifferent between cheating and honestly insuring
the parent and choosing to insure at h′′ = h′, and if surplus over cheating at h′ = h′′ is
nondecreasing in h, ∂h
′
∂θ > 0 .
7I confine attention at first to situations where the child’s surplus monotonically increases in h′;
otherwise for completeness one considers the set of acceptable human capital transfers for the child
[h˜, hˆ].
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Proposition 6. If the constrained first-best was achieved for an interior solution (i.e. at
0 < h′ < c−1(1)), such that the child is indifferent between cheating and honestly insuring
the parent and choosing to insure at h′′ = h′, and if surplus over cheating at h′ = h′′ is
nondecreasing in h, ∂h
′
∂pi > 0 .
i.e. an increase in the cost of sickness (and thus the cost of caring for the parent)
drives up the minimum human capital transfer that she would accept. Note that
an increase in the expected cost of sickness (either through increasing the cost of
sickness I or the probability of sickness pi) reduces the child’s period 1 surplus over
cheating. While an increase in the disutility owing to sickness reduces the benefit
of period 2 autarky (or period 2 cheating), it may also drive up the human capital
transfer that the child pays to her own child to get insurance. For a nondegenerate
solution, one sees that the reduction in present surplus for the child is sufficient to
increase the lowest possible human capital that she would accept to honestly insure
her parent. For a proof, see Sections D.4 and D.6. An increase in the cost to the child
of insuring the parent (measured by an increase in the disutility owing to sickness
I, probability of sickness pi and the cost incurred by the child θ) should on average
drive up the minimum acceptable transfer. For a proof, see Section D.5.
This suggests, too, that while acting as insurer the child’s minimum compensa-
tion must rise in the face of a higher expected payout.
In the following section I use numerical simulations to relax the assumption of a
constrained first-best nondegenerate solution to the parent’s problem.
2.5 Numerical Simulation
I use a numerical simulation primarily to illustrate Propositions 1, 3 and 4, with
the added benefit that it allows me to explore the parameter space in more detail.
From Section D.1, it is seen that the maximum human capital transferred by the
parent is increasing and concave in I. In Section D.4, enforcing a binding constraint
for the constrained optimum, one can see that the minimum human capital that a
child will accept is nondecreasing in I, where 0 < h′ < c−1(1), but could be concave
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or convex in I. Thus, depending on whether the minimum acceptable human capital
transfer rises faster or slower than the maximum permitted by the parent, the set of
sustainable human capital transfers either expands or contracts with I.
Thus, I allow for either, but use a numerical simulation to illustrate Propositions
1, 3 and 4, showing the set of sustainable human capital transfers as a function of
parental human capital h and cost of sickness I. Simulation further allows me to
relax the assumption of constrained optimality for a nondegenerate solution, and
that the constraint that the child achieves no more than her cheating utility must
bind.
2.5.1 Results: Numerical Solution
Following is an illustration8 of β = 0.5, pi = 0.5, θ = 0.9, f (h) = 3h, u(.) =
ln(1 + .), c(h) = h2 9. I illustrate the results of Propositions 110 and 3, and examine
Proposition 411 allowing for degenerate solutions to the child’s problem.
For any given I ∈ [0, 0.99], I calculate for any parental human capital h ∈ [0, 1],
and any realization of child human capital h′ ∈ [0, 1]: first, the surplus over autarky
for the parent and next h¯ for the parent. This yields, for any I, for any parental
human capital h, the maximum human capital that a parent will offer.
Regarding the child’s problem, I calculate for any human capital h′ ∈ [0, 1], and
any realization of child human capital h′′ ∈ [0, 1] the child’s Present Discounted
Value of not insuring the parent (as in Equation 2.6); her Present Discounted Value
of insuring the parent, and choosing autarky in Period 2 (as in Equation 2.4); h¯ for
the child (calculated as in 2.1) and her Present Discounted Value of insuring the
parent and getting insurance from her own child at h′′ (from Equation 2.5). This
yields, for any cost of sickness I, the minimum human capital (h˜) at which the child
will honestly insure the parent12.
8Code available from the author on request
9The main results hold for β = 0.5 and pi = 0.25.
10The illustration of Proposition 2 is very similar to that of Proposition 1
11The illustration of Propositions 6 and 5 are very similar to that of Proposition 4.
12I allow for the child’s surplus over cheating to increase as well as decrease in her human capital
h′. In practice, however, in the simulation the child’s surplus was increasing in h′. Thus I present
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This procedure generates, for any cost of sickness I, for any parental human
capital h, the set of sustainable human capital transfers [h˜, h¯]. The union of [h˜, h¯]
across all h gives us the set of sustainable human capital transfers for any cost of
sickness I.
2.5.1.1 Parental Human Capital Transfer
As in Section D.3, given I, h¯ is nonincreasing in h. This is illustrated for I = 0.01
(Figure E.3), I = 0.5 (Figure E.4) and I = 0.99 (Figure E.5). From Figures E.3 to E.5,
it is evident that as I rises, the range of parental human capital h for which the h¯
is the maximum possible expands i.e. parents with low levels of human capital are
likelier to participate in the insurance arrangement.
As in Section D.1, given parental human capital h, the maximum human capital
transferred by the parent (h¯) is nondecreasing and concave in I ∀h (Figure E.1, Figure
E.2). Further, the upper bound of human capital transfers is increasing and concave
in I (Figure E.6). The lower bound of h¯ across all h is nondecreasing in I (Figure E.7).
This suggests that the highest sustainable human capital transfer is nondecreasing
in I.
Therefore, agents remain in hereditary occupations in order to acquire specific
human capital with which to pay for insurance from their children, and specifically
low-paying hereditary occupations since human capital transmission to one’s child
is too costly otherwise.
2.5.1.2 Human Capital Accepted by Child
The remaining figures show suggestive illustrations of the solution to the child’s
problem. From Figure E.8, the minimum human capital that a child will accept to
honestly insure the parent rises with I, even allowing for a non-interior solution to
the parent’s problem. Further, while I allow for the minimum human capital to be
increasing and either concave or convex in I, numerical simulations in Figure E.8
suggest that h˜ is increasing and convex in I.
here the minimum acceptable human capital for the child.
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2.5.1.3 Set of Sustainable Human Capital Transfers
The union of [h˜, h¯] across h can either expand or contract with I. In the accompa-
nying numerical illustration, the largest set of sustainable human capital transfers
first expands, then contracts with I. This reflects the fact that h¯ is increasing and
concave in I, while h˜ is increasing and convex in I. Thus, for small values of the
cost of sickness, any increment in the cost of sickness causes a larger increase in the
maximum willingness to pay of the parent than of the child, offset at larger values
of the disutility owing to sickness I.
2.6 Conclusion
Developing countries have long relied on informal networks to smooth con-
sumption in the event of sickness or aging. As with Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009),
these networks limited mobility, and enforced co-operation through participation
in activities (such as endogamy or repeated social interactions within a closed net-
work) that would strengthen the ability of the group to punish defaulters.
This paper studies specific human capital provision in exchange for insurance
provision, and finds that both occupational specialization and the retention of chil-
dren in low-paying hereditary occupations can be generated as a result. This sug-
gests a reason for the persistence of ancestral occupations, and in particular for low-
paying ones, in the absence of adequate insurance provision.
While the baseline model raises some suggestive points, there are many exten-
sions to consider. The main prediction of this model is that, as alternative means
of insurance become available to the elderly, one should observe lower retention
of children in ancestral occupations, and lower rates of children coresiding with el-
derly parents. Further work would seek to empirically examine the impact of an
exogenous increase in access to credit and access for the rural elderly.
Currently, this paper assumes that the value of parental human capital remains
fixed in perpetuity. Further work would consider allowing some volatility in agent
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payoffs if the child remains in the ancestral occupation. I would also like to empir-
ically examine the impact of an exogenous and permanent increase in the human
capital of the parent on her participation in the insurance arrangement.
This paper assumes that children have no non-specific human capital of their
own. Further work would examine the impact on optimal human capital transfers
to the child of varying the child’s non-specific human capital, and allowing for the
child’s non-specific human capital to either complement or substitute for the par-
ent’s occupation-specific human capital.
Allowing for a child to have its own human capital might raise some interesting
questions regarding either the optimum care that a child gives to its parent or the
optimum human capital transfer that a parent makes to a child. Currently, I only
allow for full coverage in the case of sickness, so the only decision that the child
makes is whether or not to care for the parent- the cost of caring for an ailing parent
is exogenous. Further work would allow for partial insurance and examine optimal
human capital transfers as a function of both the cost of sickness and the child’s
non-specific human capital.
Further work would also examine the advantages of caste structures versus appren-
ticeships- specifically, the channel through which information transmission works
between members of a family or practitioners of an occupation. A parent may have
better information about the type or productivity of her child than of an appren-
tice, or simply have greater power to punish a defaulting child than an apprentice.
Further work would examine whether these two channels generate differential pre-
dictions about the optimum human capital transfer and the nature of occupations at
which apprenticeships dominate hereditary human capital transfer.
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Chapter 3
Has ICT Polarized Skill Demand?
Evidence from Eleven Countries over
25 years
3.1 Introduction
The demand for highly skilled workers has risen significantly since the early
1980s across the US, UK and several other countries (Acemoglu and Autor (2010)),
and the return to a college education has risen despite the rise in the supply of
college-educated workers. The consensus is that technological progress drives this
increase in skill demand (Goldin and Katz (2008)), rather than higher trade with
low-wage countries, although some recent literature suggests that the role of trade
has been understated (Krugman (2008)).
Recent studies have suggested, however, a more complex picture. While the
wages of college graduates in the US rose relative to high-school graduates over the
past thirty years, those of high-school graduates rose relative to those of high school
dropouts rose in the 1980s, but not after (Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), Autor,
Katz, and Kearney (2008)). At the same time, so-called “upper tail”inequality (i.e.
between the 90th and 50th percentiles of the wage distribution) rose over the past
thirty years, while “lower tail ”inequality rose during the 1980s, but not since. In
the UK, we find that middle-skilled occupations have lost relative to high and low-
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skilled occupations (Goos and Manning (2007)). Similar results have been found
in Germany (Spitz-Oener (2006)) and many other OECD countries (Goos, Manning,
and Salomons (2009)).
One explanation for this phenomenon is that of “Skill Biased Technical Change”1,
suggesting that new technologies complement highly-skilled workers and thus drive
up the demand for them.
Recent work, notably that of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), suggests the
more nuanced view that new technologies complement those performing nonroutine
tasks, and substitute those performing routine cognitive tasks. Many non-routine
cognitive tasks (e.g. surgery, consulting or academia) are performed by highly edu-
cated workers, while many routine cognitive tasks (e.g. clerical) were performed by
middle-skilled workers, who were gradually replaced by ongoing computerization.
Low-skilled workers frequently perform non-routine manual tasks (e.g. janitorial
work). Routine manual tasks performed by low-skilled workers (e.g. assembly-line
manufacturing) dropped out of the pictures after the 1970s, and so the greatest gains
were experienced by the highly-skilled group, and the greatest loss by the middle
group.
Using data from the United States Census and the Directory of Occupational Ti-
tles, we show first that middle-skilled workers cluster disproportionately in routine
cognitive tasks, and low-skilled workers have a high presence in non-routine man-
ual tasks. Then, using the EUKLEMS dataset providing capital accounts and labour
disaggregated by education group for a panel of 11 OECD countries (the US, Japan
and 9 other OECD countries) over 25 years (1980-2004), show that those industries
with the fastest increase in ICT compensation did indeed show the greatest increase
in demand for college-educated workers and the greatest fall in demand for middle-
skilled workers, consistent with the polarization hypothesis.
This paper is the first to provide direct international evidence that skills-technology
1See Bond and Reenen (2007) for a survey. Industry level data are used by Berman, Bound, and
Griliches (1994), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) and Machin and Reenen (1998). Krueger (1993),
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1997) and Lang (2002) use individual data.
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complementarity benefits highly-skilled workers at the cost of middle-skilled work-
ers, consistent with the polarization hypothesis. Other work has shown a similar
substitution (Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Autor and Dorn (2009)) but only for
America. Prior to this, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) show that the rise in the use
of computers between 1984 and 1993 was correlated to a fall overall in the demand
for high-school graduates between 1979 and 1993, but we provide evidence for a
panel of 11 countries over a longer time-period.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
We exploit the new EUKLEMS database, which provides data on college grad-
uates and disaggregates non-college workers into two groups: those with low edu-
cation and those with “middle level” education2. For example, in the US the mid-
dle education group includes those with some college and high school graduates,
but excludes high school drop-outs and GEDs (see Timmer, van Moergastel, Stuiv-
enwold, Ypma, O’Mahony, and Kangasniemi (2007), Table 5.3 for the country spe-
cific breakdown). The EUKLEMS database covers eleven developed economies (US,
Japan, and nine countries in Western Europe) from 1980-2004 and also contains data
on ICT capital. In analyzing the data we consider not only the potential role of ICT,
but also several alternative explanations. In particular, we examine whether the
role of trade in changing skill demand could have become more important in recent
years (most of the early studies pre-dated the growth of China and India as major
exporters).
The idea behind our empirical strategy is that the rapid fall in quality-adjusted
ICT prices will have a greater effect in some country-industry pairs that are more
reliant on ICT. This is because some industries are for technological reasons inher-
ently more reliant on ICT than others. We have no compelling natural experiment,
however, so our results should be seen primarily as conditional correlations. We
2In the paper we refer to the three skill groups as ”high-skilled” (or sometimes as the ”college”
group), ”middle-skilled”, and ”low-skilled”.
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do, however, implement some instrumental variable strategies using the industry-
specific initial levels of US ICT intensity and/or routine tasks as an instrument for
subsequent ICT increases in other countries. These support the OLS results. We con-
clude that technical change has raised relative demand for college educated workers
and, consistent with the ICT-based polarization hypothesis, this increase has come
mainly from reducing the relative demand for middle-skilled workers rather than
low-skilled workers.
Our approach of using industry and education is complementary to the alter-
native approach of using occupations and their associated tasks. Goos, Manning,
and Salomons (2011), for example, use wage and employment changes in occupa-
tions based on task content, for example, to show that “routine” occupations are in
decline and that these are in the middle of the wage distribution. In order to exam-
ine ICT-based theories of polarization, however, we believe it is important to have
direct measures of ICT capital. Such data is not generally available for individu-
als consistently across countries and years, which is why using the EUKLEMS data
is so valuable. As noted above, however, we do use the occupational information
to construct instrumental variables for the growth of ICT at the industry level over
time.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section II describes the empirical model, Section
III the data and Section IV the empirical results. Section V offers some concluding
comments.
3.3 Empirical Model
Consider the short-run variable cost function, CV(.):
CV(WH, WM, WL; C, K, Q) (3.1)
where W indicates hourly wages and superscripts denote education/skill group
S (H = highly educated workers, M = middle educated workers and L = low ed-
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ucated workers), K = non-ICT capital services, C = ICT capital services and Q =
value added. If we assume that the capital stocks are quasi-fixed, factor prices are
exogenous and that the cost function can be approximated by a second order flexi-
ble functional form such as the translog, then cost minimization (using Shephard’s
Lemma) implies the following three skill share equations:
SHAREH = φHH ln(WH/WL)
+φMH ln(WM/WL)
+αCH ln(C/Q)
+αKH ln(K/Q)
+αQH ln Q
SHAREM = φHM ln(WH/WL)
+φMM ln(WM/WL)
+αCM ln(C/Q)
+αKM ln(K/Q)
+αQM ln Q
SHAREL = φHL ln(WH/WL)
+φML ln(WM/WL)
+αCL ln(C/Q)
+αKL ln(K/Q)
+αQM ln Q,
where SHARES= W
S NS
WH NH+WS NM+WL NL is the wage bill share of skill group S =
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{H, M, L} and NS is the number of hours worked by skill group S. Our hypoth-
esis of the ICT-based polarization theory is that αCH > 0 and αCM < 0 (with the sign
of αCL being ambiguous)3.
Our empirical specifications are based on these equations. We assume that labor
markets are national in scope and include country by time effects (φjt) to capture
the relative wage terms. We also check our results are robust to including industry-
specific relative wages directly on the right hand side of the share regressions. We
allow for unobserved heterogeneity between industry by country pairs (ηij) and in-
clude fixed effects to account for these, giving the following three equations:
SHARES = φjt + ηij + αCS ln(C/Q)ijt + αKS ln(K/Q)ijt + αQS ln Qijt, (3.2)
where i = industry, j =country and t = year. We estimate in long (25 year) dif-
ferences, ∆, to look at the historical trends and smooth out measurement error. We
substitute levels rather than logarithms (i.e. ∆(C/Q) instead of ∆ ln(C/Q)) because
of the very large changes in ICT intensity over this time period. Some industry by
country pairs had close to zero IT intensity in 1980 so their change is astronomical
in logarithmic terms4. Consequently our three key estimating equations are:
∆SHARESijt = c
S
j + β
S
1∆(C/Q)ijt + β
S
2∆(K/Q)ijt + β
S
3∆ ln Qijt + u
S
ijt. (3.3)
In the robustness tests we also consider augmenting equation (3.3) in various
ways. Since ICT is only one aspect of technical change we also consider using Re-
search and Development (R&D) expenditures. This is a more indirect measure of
task-based technical change, but it has been used in the prior literature, so it could
be an important omitted variable. Additionally, we consider trade variables (such
3The exact correspondence between the coefficients on the capital inputs and the Hicks-Allen
elasticity of complementarity is more complex (see Brown and Christensen (1981)).
4The range of ∆ ln(C/Q) lies between -1 and 23.5. We report robustness checks using ∆(C/Q)C/Q as
an approximation for ∆ ln(C/Q).
73
as imports plus exports over value added) to test whether industries that were ex-
posed to more trade upgraded the skills of their workforce at a more rapid rate than
those who did not. This is a pragmatic empirical approach to examining trade ef-
fects. Under a strict Heckscher-Ohlin approach trade is a general equilibrium effect
increasing wage inequality throughout the economy so looking at the variation by
industry would be uninformative. However, since trade costs have declined more
rapidly in some sectors than others (e.g. due to trade liberalization) we would ex-
pect the actual flows of trade to proxy this change and there to be a larger effect on
workers in these sectors than in others who were less affected (Krugman (2008) also
makes this argument).
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Data Construction
The main source of data for this paper is the EUKLEMS dataset, which contains
data on value added, labor, capital, skills and ICT for various industries in many
developed countries (see Timmer, van Moergastel, Stuivenwold, Ypma, O’Mahony,
and Kangasniemi (2007)). The EUKLEMS data are constructed using data from each
country’s National Statistical Office (e.g. the US Census Bureau) and harmonized
with each country’s national accounts. EUKLEMS contains some data on most
OECD countries. But since we require data on skill composition, ICT and non-
ICT capital and value added between 1980 and 2004, our sample of countries is
restricted to eleven: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the USA5.
Another choice we had to make regards the set of industries we analyze. Since
our baseline year (1980) was close to the peak of the oil boom, we have dropped
energy-related sectors - mining and quarrying, coke manufactures and the supply of
5In order to increase the number of countries we would need to considerably shorten the period
we analyze. For example, limiting our analysis to 1992-2004 (12 years instead of 25) only adds Bel-
gium. To further add Czech Republic, Slovenia and Sweden we would need to restrict the sample to
1995-2004. In order to preserve the longer time series we focused on the 11 core OECD countries.
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natural gas - from the sample (we report results that are very robust to the inclusion
of these sectors). The remaining sample includes 27 industries in each country (see
Table G.10). Wage data by skill category are only reported separately by industry
in some countries. We therefore aggregate industries to the lowest possible level of
aggregation for which all the variables we use could be constructed with the precise
level of disaggregation varied by country (see Table G.11)6. Our final sample has
208 observations on country-industry cells for 1980 and 2004. We also have data for
intervening years, which we use in some of the robustness checks.
For each country-industry-year cell in our dataset we construct a number of vari-
ables. Our main outcome is the wage bill share of workers of different educational
groups, which is a standard indicator for skill demand. In 9 of the 11 countries, the
high-skilled group indicates whether an employee has attained a college degree7. A
novel feature of our analysis is that we also consider the wage bill of middle-skilled
workers. The precise composition of this group varies across countries, since educa-
tional systems differ considerably. But typically, this group consists of high school
graduates, people with some college education, and people with non-academic pro-
fessional degrees.
Our main measure for use of new technology is Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) capital divided by value added. Similarly, we also use the mea-
sure of non-ICT capital divided by value added. EUKLEMS builds these variables
using the perpetual inventory method from the underlying investment flow data
for several types of capital. For the tradable industries (Agriculture and Manufac-
turing) we construct measures of trade flows using UN COMTRADE data8. Details
are contained in H.2.
Finally, we construct measures of skill and task content by occupation. We begin
6Results are robust to throwing away information and harmonizing all countries at the same level
of industry aggregation.
7In two countries the classification of high-skilled workers is different: in Denmark it includes
people in “long cycle” higher education and in Finland it includes people with tertiary education or
higher.
8Using a crosswalk (available from the authors upon request) we calculate the value of total trade,
imports and exports with the rest of the world and separately with OECD and non-OECD countries.
We identify all 30 countries that were OECD members in 2007 as part of the OECD.
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with US Census micro data for 1980 from IPUMS, which identify each person’s ed-
ucation (which we aggregate to three skill levels using the EUKLEMS concordance
for the US) and occupation. We then use the “80-90” occupation classification from
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) to add information on the task measures they con-
struct. These include routine cognitive tasks (measured using Set limits, Tolerances,
or Standards); routine manual tasks (measured using Finger Dexterity); non-routine
cognitive tasks measured using both (i) Quantitative reasoning requirements and
(ii) Direction, Control, and Planning and non-routine manual tasks (measured us-
ing Eye-Hand-Foot coordination). We standardize each of these five task measures
by subtracting the mean task score across occupations, weighted by person weights,
and dividing the result by the standard deviation of the measure across occupations.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
3.4.2.1 The Routineness of Occupations by Skill Level
We begin the description of the data by examining the relationship between ed-
ucation and tasks. Table G.2 reports the top 10 occupations for each of the three
education categories using US data for 1980. This table shows that the occupations
with the largest shares of highly-educated workers (such as physicians, lawyers and
teachers) and those with the highest shares of low-educated workers (such as clean-
ers and farm workers) have low scores on routine cognitive tasks. These groups
also have typically low scores on routine manual tasks. By contrast, occupations
with high shares of middle-educated workers (mostly clerical occupations and bank
tellers) typically score highly on both routine cognitive and routine manual tasks.
Therefore, if the only contribution of ICT was to automate (and replace) routine
tasks, it should benefit both high-skilled and low-skilled workers at the expense of
middle-skilled workers.
However, as argued by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) information technol-
ogy should also complement non-routine tasks, especially cognitive ones. Here the
picture is more nuanced: high-skilled occupations typically score highly on non-
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routine cognitive tasks, though not on non-routine manual tasks. Middle-skilled
occupations tend to score around average in non-routine tasks, while low-skilled
workers score low on non-routine cognitive tasks but above average on non-routine
manual tasks. Therefore, to the extent that information technology both replaces
routine tasks and complements non-routine tasks, the overall picture suggests that
ICT should increase the relative demand for high-skilled workers at the expense of
middle-skilled workers, with no clear effect on low-skilled workers.
We further explore the relationship between education groups and tasks in Table
G.1, which reports the average tasks content by skill group, again using 1980 US
data. On average, high-skilled occupations rank lowest in terms of routine tasks
and non-routine manual tasks, but highest in terms of non-routine cognitive tasks,
so the Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) model suggests that they benefit from ICT
improvements. Middle-skilled occupations score above-average on routine tasks
and a little below average on non-routine tasks, so ICT should probably reduce the
relative demand for their services. Lastly, the picture for low-skilled workers is once
again mixed, for both routine and non-routine tasks, so the theory gives no clear
prediction on how ICT improvements should affect the demand for their services.
Having discussed the relationship between skills and tasks, we now move on to
describe the changes in skill demand using the EUKLEMS data.
3.4.2.2 Cross Country Trends
Panel A of Table G.3 shows summary statistics for the levels of the key vari-
ables in 1980 across each country and Panel B presents the same for the changes
through 2004. The levels have to be interpreted with care as exact comparison of
qualifications between countries is difficult, which is why wage bill shares are use-
ful summary measures as each qualification is weighted by its price (the wage)9.
The ranking of countries looks sensible with the US having the highest share of
high-skilled (29 percent), followed by Finland (27 percent). All countries have ex-
9Estimating in differences also reduces the suspected bias from international differences as the
definitions are stable within country over time.
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perienced significant skill upgrading as indicated by the growth in the high-skilled
wage bill share in column (1) of Panel B, on average the share increased form 14.3
percent in 1980 to 24.3 in 2004.
The UK had the fastest absolute increase in the high-skilled wage bill share (16.5
percentage points) and is also the country with the largest increase in ICT intensity.
The US had the second largest growth of ICT and the third largest increase in the
high-skilled wage bill share (13.9 percentage points), but all countries have experi-
enced rapid increases in ICT intensity, which doubled its 1980 share of value added.
Figures F.1 to F.3 show the correlation between the growth of the wage bill share of
each of the three education groups and ICT intensity. There appears to be a posi-
tive relationship for the highly educated (Figure F.1), a negative relationship for the
middle educated (Figure F.2) and no relationship for the least educated (Figure F.3).
Although this is supportive of our model’s predictions, there are many other influ-
ences at the country-level so our econometric results below will focus on the within
country, across industry variation.
Returning to Table G.2, note that the change of the middle education share in
column (2) is more uneven. Although the mean growth is positive, it is relatively
small compared to the highly educated (8.7 percentage points on a base of 51.1 per-
cent), with several countries experiencing no growth or a decrease (the US and the
Netherlands).
Moreover, as Figures F.4 to F.5 shows, although the wage bill share of the middle
group rose more rapidly (in percentage point terms) between 1980 and 1986, it sub-
sequently decelerated. Indeed, in the last six year sub-period, 1998-2004, the wage
bill share of middle-skilled workers actually fell. At the same time, the wage bill
share of low-skilled workers continued to decline throughout the period 1980-2004,
but at an increasingly slower rate. Figure F.5 shows the US, the technology leader
that is often a future indicator for other nations. From 1998-2004 the wage bill share
of the middle educated declined more rapidly than that of the low-educated work-
ers. Figure F.5 is in line with the finding that while college educated US workers
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continued to gain relative to high-school graduates, high-school graduates gained
relatively to college dropouts in the 1980s but not in the 1990s (see Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2008)).
3.4.2.3 Cross Industry Trends
Tables G.4 and G.5 break down the data by industry. In levels (Table G.4) the
highly educated were disproportionately clustered into services both in the public
sector (especially education) and private sector (e.g. real estate and business ser-
vices). The industries that upgraded skills rapidly (Table G.5) were also mainly ser-
vices (e.g. finance, telecoms and business services), but also in manufacturing (e.g.
chemicals and electrical equipment). At the other end of the skill distribution, the
textile industry, which initially had the lowest wage bill share of skilled workers,
upgraded somewhat more than other low-skill industries (transport and storage,
construction, hotels and restaurants, and agriculture). This raises the issue of mean
reversion, so we are careful to later show robustness tests to conditioning on the
initial levels of the skill shares in our regressions. In fact, the ranking of industries
in terms of skill intensity in 1980 and their skill upgrading over the next 25 years
was quite similar across countries. This is striking, because the countries we ana-
lyze had different labor market institutions and different institutional experiences
over the period we analyze. This suggests something fundamental is at play that
cuts across different sets of institutions.
ICT grew dramatically from 1980-2004, accounting for more than 42 percent of
the average increase in capital services (see columns (8) and (9) of Table G.5). The
increased ICT diffusion was also quite uneven: financial intermediation and tele-
coms experienced rapid increases in ICT intensity, while in other industries, such as
agriculture, there was almost no increase.
Figures F.6, F.7, F.8, F.9, and F.10 and F.11 plot changes by industry in the wage
bill shares of high, medium, and low-skilled workers, respectively, against changes
in ICT intensity. The top panel (A) of each figure includes all industries with fitted
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regression lines (solid line for all industry and dashed line for non-traded sectors
only). The bottom panel (B) restricts attention to the traded sectors. Figure F.6 shows
that the industries with the fastest ICT upgrading had the largest increase in the
high-skilled wage bill share. One might be worried that two service sectors, “Post &
Telecommunications” and “Financial Intermediation”, are driving this result, which
is one reason Figure F.7 drops all the non-traded sectors. In fact, the relationship
between high-skilled wage bill growth and ICT growth is actually stronger in these
“well measured” sectors.
Figures F.8 and F.9 repeat this analysis for the middle educated groups. We ob-
serve the exact opposite relationship to Figures F.6 and F.7: the industries with the
faster ICT growth had the largest fall in the middle-skilled share whether we look
at the whole economy (Figure F.8) or just the traded sectors (Figure F.9). Finally,
Figures F.10 and F.11 show that there is essentially no relationship (Figure F.10) or a
mildly positive one (Figure F.11) between the change of the share of the least edu-
cated and ICT growth.
These figures are highly suggestive of empirical support for the hypothesis that
ICT polarizes the skill structure: increasing demand at the top, reducing demand in
the middle and having little effect at the bottom. To examine this link more rigor-
ously, we now turn to the econometric analysis.
3.5 Econometric Results
3.5.1 Basic Results
Our first set of results for the skill share regressions are reported in Table G.6.
The dependent variables are changes from 1980-2004 in the wage bill share of the
high-skilled in Panel A, the middle-skilled in Panel B and the low-skilled in Panel
C. The first four columns look across the entire economy and the last four columns
condition on the sub-sample of “tradable” sectors where we have information on
imports and exports.
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Column (1) of Panel A reports the coefficient on the constant, which indicates
that on average there was a ten percentage point increase in the college wage bill
share. This is a very large increase, considering the average skill share in 1980
(across our sample of countries) was only 14%. Column (2) includes the growth
in ICT capital intensity. The technology variable has a large, positive and signifi-
cant coefficient and reduces the regression constant to 8.7. Column (3) includes the
growth of non-ICT capital intensity and value added. The coefficient on non-ICT
capital is negative and insignificant, suggesting that there is no sign of (non-ICT)
capital-skill complementarity. Some studies have found capital-skill complementar-
ity (e.g. Griliches (1969)), but few of these studies have disaggregated capital into
its ICT and non-ICT components, so the evidence for capital-skill complementarity
may be due to aggregating over high-tech capital that is complementary with skills
and lower tech capital that is not. The coefficient on value added growth is positive
and significant suggesting that skill upgrading has been occurring more rapidly in
the fastest growing sectors (as in Berman, Somanathan, and Tan (2005)). Column (4)
includes country fixed effects. This is a demanding specification because the spec-
ification is already in differences so this specification essentially allows for country
specific trends. The coefficient on ICT falls (from 65 to 47) but remains significant at
conventional levels10
We re-estimate these specifications for the tradable industries in the next four
columns. Column (5) shows that the overall increase in the college wage-bill share
from 1980-2004 was 9 percentage points - similar to that in the whole sample. Columns
(6) - (8) add in our measure of ICT and other controls. The coefficient on ICT in the
tradable sector is positive, highly significant and larger than in the overall sample
(e.g. 129 in column (8)).
Panel B of Table G.6 reports estimates for the same specifications as panel A, but
this time the dependent variable is the share of middle-educated workers. Column
10Including the mineral extraction sectors caused the ICT coefficient to fall from 47 to 45. We also
tried including a set of industry dummies in column (4). All the variables became insignificant in
this specification. This suggests that it is the same industries that are upgrading across countries.
81
(1) shows that the wage bill share of middle-skilled workers grew by 8.7 percent-
age points over this time period. But as the rest of the panel shows, the association
between the change in middle-skilled workers and ICT is strongly negative. In col-
umn (4), for example, a one percentage point increase in ICT intensity is associated
with a 0.8 percentage point fall in the proportion of middle-skilled workers. The
magnitude of the coefficients for the sample that includes all industries is quite sim-
ilar to those for college educated workers. Panel C shows that technology measures
appear to be insignificant for the least educated workers, illustrating the point that
the main role of ICT appears to be in changing demand between the high-skilled
and middle-skilled groups11. Since the adding up requirement means that the coef-
ficients for the least skilled group can be deduced from the other two skill groups
we save space by omitting Panel C in the rest of the Tables.
Overall, Table G.6 shows a pattern of results consistent with ICT based polariza-
tion. Industries where ICT grew most strongly where those with the largest shifts
towards the most skilled and the largest shifts away from the middle skilled, with
the least skilled largely unaffected.
3.5.2 Robustness and Extensions
3.5.2.1 Initial conditions
Table G.7 examines some robustness checks using the results in our preferred
specification of column (4) of Table G.6 (reproduced in the first column). Since there
may be mean reversion we include the level of initial share of skills in 1980 in col-
umn (2). This does not qualitatively alter the results, although coefficient on ICT for
the middle-skilled does fall somewhat 12.
11The difference in the importance of ICT for the middle and lowest skill groups implies that high
school graduates are not perfect substitutes for college graduates as Card (2009) argues in the US
context. The majority of our data is from outside the US, however, where there are relatively fewer
high school graduates.
12As we explain above our specifications assume that markets are national in scope, so that coun-
try fixed effects capture changes in relative wages. To further test this assumption we re-estimated
columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 with additional controls for the change in the difference in industry
specific relative ln(wages) between the high-skilled and middle-skilled and between the high-skilled
and low-skilled. The resulting coefficients (standard errors) on our measure of ICT are 41.43 (15.24)
and 35.98 (14.82) for high-skilled workers, and -54.38 (20.96) and -33.35 (13.87) for middle-skilled
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3.5.2.2 Timing of changes in skills and ICT
One limitation of the specifications that we discussed so far is that the changes
on the right-hand side and left hand-side are both concurrent. To mitigate potential
concerns about reverse causation, we re-estimate the baseline specification of col-
umn (1) Table G.7, where the right hand side variables are measured for the first half
of the period we consider (1980-1992) and the left hand side variable is measured for
the second half of the period (1992-2004). The estimated coefficients (and standard
errors) on changes in our measure of ICT are 52.62 (23.53) for high-skilled workers
and -52.52 (28.97) for middle-skilled workers. These results are almost unchanged
(51.31 (22.65) and -58.22 (22.99) respectively) when we instead use the equivalent of
the specification in column (2) of Table 6.
3.5.2.3 Heterogeneity in the coefficients across countries
Wage inequality rose less in Continental Europe than elsewhere, so it is inter-
esting to explore whether technological change induced polarization even there.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table G.7 restrict the sample to the 8 Continental Euro-
pean countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands
and Spain), and the results are similar to those in the full sample of countries. For
example, column (5) shows that the correlation between ICT and polarization is
larger for the US than for the full sample, though column (5) shows that the esti-
mates become imprecise when we control for baseline levels of skill composition.
The sample size for most individual countries is rather small, but if we re-estimate
the specification of Table G.7 column (2) separately country by country we obtain
negative coefficients on ICT for all 11 countries for medium skill shares and positive
coefficients for 10 countries for the high skill shares (Japan is the single exception)13.
The results are also robust to dropping any single country14.
workers.
13The mean of the 11 country-specific coefficients on ICT is very similar to the pooled results (-112
for the middle-skilled share and 71 for the high-skilled share).
14For example, we had concerns about the quality of the education data in Italy so we dropped
Italy from the sample. In the specification of column (4) of Table G.6, the coefficient (standard error)
on ICT capital was 55.2(1.04) for the high education group and -68.54(22.82) for the middle educated.
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3.5.2.4 Instrumental variables
One concern is that measurement error in the right hand side variables, espe-
cially our measure of ICT, causes attenuation bias15. To mitigate this concern, we
use the industry-level measures of ICT in the US in 1980 as an instrument for ICT
upgrading over the whole sample. The intuition behind this instrument is that the
dramatic global fall in quality-adjusted ICT prices since 1980 (e.g. Jorgenson, Ho,
and Stiroh (2008)) disproportionately affects industries that (for exogenous techno-
logical reasons) have a greater potential for using ICT inputs. An indicator of this
potential is the initial ICT intensity in the technological leader, the US. As column
(7) of Table G.7 shows, this instrument has a first-stage F-statistic of 10.5, and the
sign of the first stage regressions (not reported) is as we would expect, namely in-
dustries that were more ICT-intensive in 1980 upgraded their use of ICT more than
others. In the 2SLS estimates of column (7) the coefficient on ICT is roughly twice
as large as the OLS coefficients for the college educated group (and significant at
the 5 percent level), and a little bigger for the middle-skilled group. Column (8) re-
port estimates the same specification but this time excluding the US itself, and the
results are very similar. While we acknowledge that estimates using this instrument
do not necessarily uncover the causal effect of ICT, it is reassuring that these 2SLS
estimates are somewhat larger than the OLS estimates, as we would expect given
the likely measurement error.
As a further check, we use the proportion of routine tasks in the industry (in the
US in the base year) as an instrument for future ICT growth as these industries were
most likely to be affected by falling ICT prices (see Autor and Dorn, 2009). The re-
sults of using this instrument are shown in columns (9) and (10). Although the first
stages are weaker with this instrument16, and the 2SLS estimates are not very pre-
15Estimates of the ICT coefficient for the two 12-year sub-periods of our data are typically about
half of the absolute magnitude of those for the full period. In general, our estimates for shorter time
periods are smaller and less precise, consistent with the importance of measurement error in the ICT
data. For example, in the specification of column (4) of Panel A in Table G.6, the coefficient (standard
error) on ICT was 18.30 (10.30) in a pooled 12 year regression. We could not reject the hypothesis that
the ICT coefficient was stable over time (p-value=0.35).
16The signs of the instruments in the first stage are correct. The F-test is 6.5 in column (9) compared
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cise, these columns again suggest that we may be under-estimating the importance
of ICT by just using OLS.
3.5.2.5 Disaggregating the wage bill into wages and hours
The wage bill share of each skill group reflects its hourly wage and hours worked,
and those of the other skill groups. We estimated specifications that are identical to
those in Table G.6, except that they disaggregate the dependent variable into the
growth of relative skill prices and quantities. In the first two columns of Table G.8
we reproduce the baseline specifications using the log relative wage bill (which can
be exactly decomposed) as the dependent variable17. Columns (1) - (4) confirm what
we have already seem using a slightly different functional form: ICT growth is asso-
ciated with a significant increase in the demand for high-skilled workers relative to
middle-skilled workers (first two columns) and with a significant (but smaller) in-
crease for low-skilled workers relative to middle-skilled workers (third and fourth
columns).
For the high vs. middle-skill group, ICT growth is significantly associated with
increases in relative wages and relative hours (columns (5), (6), (9) and (10)). In
comparing the middle vs. low groups, the coefficients are also all correctly signed,
but not significant at conventional levels. Overall this suggests that our results are
robust to functional form and the shifting pattern of demand operates both through
wages and hours worked18.
3.5.3 Trade, R&D and skill upgrading
Having found that technology upgrading is associated with substitution of college-
educated workers for middle-educated workers, we now examine whether changes
to 10.5 in column (7).
17Another functional form check was using the growth rate of ICT intensity. For the specification
in column (3) of Panel A in Table G.6 we replaced ∆(C/Q) with ∆(C/Q)C/Q . The coefficient (standard
error) on ICT growth was 2.586 (1.020). The marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase
(0.581) is 1.50 (=0.581*2.586), almost identical to 1.55 (=0.024*64.6) in Table G.6.
18In examining these results across countries there was some evidence that the adjustment in wages
was stronger in the US and the adjustment in hours was stronger in Continental Europe. This is
consistent with the idea of great wage flexibility in the US than in Europe.
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in trade exhibit similar patterns. The first three columns of Table G.9 suggest that
more trade openness (measured as the ratio of imports plus exports to value added)
is associated with increases in the wage bill share of college educated workers and
declines in the share for middle-skilled workers. However, the when we control
for initial R&D intensity the association between trade and skill upgrading becomes
smaller and insignificant. Column (4) repeats the specification of column (3) for the
sub-sample where we have R&D data and shows that the trade coefficient is ro-
bust. Column (5) includes R&D intensity in a simple specification and shows that
the coefficient on trade falls (e.g. from 0.50 to 0.24 in Panel A) and is insignificant,
whereas the coefficient on R&D is positive and significant. In column (6) we include
the changes in the ICT and non-ICT capital stocks and the coefficient on trade is
now very small. Column (7) drops the insignificant trade variable and shows that
ICT and R&D and individually (and jointly) significant.
We also used the Feenstra and Hansen (1999) method of constructing an off-
shoring variable and included it instead of (and alongside) trade in final goods. The
offshoring variable has more explanatory power than final goods trade19. Column
(8) includes offshoring (“Imported Intermediate Inputs”) into the full sample as it
can be defined for all industries. The results suggest a significant positive correla-
tion between offshoring for high skilled workers and a negative but insignificant
correlation between ICT and demand for middle skilled workers. Column (9) pro-
duces a similar result on the sample of tradable sectors and column (10) includes
ICT and R&D. As with the trade measure in final goods, the offshoring coefficient is
driven to zero in the final column for the highly educated and remains insignificant
for the middle educated. The ICT effects are robust to the inclusion of the offshoring
measures.
These findings are broadly consistent with most of the literature that finds that
technology variables have more explanatory power than trade in these kinds of skill
19For example, in the same specification of column (6) of Table G.9 we replaced the final goods
trade variable with the offshoring measure. In the high skilled equation the coefficient (standard
error) was 4.27 (2.82) and in the middle skilled equation the coefficient (standard error) was -11.6
(9.87).
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demand equations20. Of course, trade could be influencing skill demand through
affecting the incentives to innovate and adopt new technologies, which is why trade
ceases to be important after we condition on technology (e.g. Bloom, Draca, and
Reenen (2011), argue in favor of this trade-induced technical change hypothesis)21.
Furthermore, there could be many general equilibrium effects of trade that we have
not accounted for (these are controlled for by the country time effects).
3.5.4 Magnitudes
We perform some “back of the envelope” calculations in Table G.13 to gauge the
magnitude of the effect of technology on the demand for highly skilled workers.
Column (1) estimates that ICT accounts for 13.2 percent of the increase in the col-
lege share in the whole sample without controls and column (2) reduces this to 8.5
percent with controls. Many authors (e.g. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008)) have
argued that value added growth has been strongly affected by ICT growth, espe-
cially in the later period, so column (2) probably underestimates the effect of ICT.
Column (3) reports equivalent calculations for the tradable sectors. Here, ICT ac-
counts for 16.5 percent of the change and R&D a further 16.1 percent, suggesting
that observable technology measures by account for almost a third of the increase
in demand for highly skilled workers. If we include controls in column (4) this falls
to 23.1 percent. Finally, columns (5) and (6) report results for the IV specification for
the whole sample, showing an ICT contribution of ICT of between 22.1 percent and
27.7 percent22.
20These are simple industry-level correlations and not general equilibrium calculations, so we may
be missing out the role of trade through other routes.
21We further test whether the association between trade and skill upgrading remains similar when
we examine different components of trade separately. Table G.12 suggests that when we examine im-
ports and exports separately, the picture is quite similar. Greater trade is associated with an increase
in the college wage bill share until we control for initial R&D intensity, in which case the coefficient
on trade falls and becomes insignificant. Results are similar when we analyze separately imports to
(or exports from) OECD countries. For non-OECD countries the results are again the same, except
for exports to non-OECD countries, which remains positively associated with changes in the college
wage-bill share even after we add all the controls, including R&D. However, it should be noted that
the change in exports to developing countries is on average very small.
22The IV specifications for tradeables show an even larger magnitude. For example in a specifica-
tion with full controls, R&D and ICT combined account for over half of all the change in the college
wage bill share. The first stage for the IV is weak, however, with an F-statistic of 6, these cannot be
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We also note that while ICT upgrading alone should have led to decreased de-
mand for middle-skilled workers. While we do not see such a decrease overall, Fig-
ure F.5 shows a slowdown in the growth of demand for middle skilled over time,
and a reversal (in other words negative growth) for middle-skilled workers from
1998-2004.
We have no general equilibrium model, so these are only “back of the envelope”
calculations to give an idea of magnitudes. Furthermore, measurement error prob-
ably means that we are probably underestimating the importance of the variables.
Nevertheless, it seems that our measures of technology are important in explaining
a significant proportion of the increase in demand for college educated workers at
the expense of the middle-skilled.
3.6 Conclusions
Recent investigations into the changing demand for skills in OECD countries
have found some evidence for “polarization” in the labour market in the sense that
workers in the middle of the wage and skills distribution appear to have fared more
poorly than those at the bottom and the top. One explanation that has been ad-
vanced for this is that ICT has complemented non-routine analytic tasks but substi-
tuted for routine tasks whilst not affecting non-routine manual tasks (like cleaning,
gardening, childcare, etc.). This implies that many middle-skilled groups like bank
clerks and paralegals performing routine tasks have suffered a fall in demand. To
test this we have estimated industry-level skill share equations distinguishing three
education groups and related this to ICT (and R&D) investments in eleven coun-
tries over 25 years using newly available data. Our findings are supportive of the
ICT-based polarization hypothesis as industries that experienced the fastest growth
in ICT also experienced the fastest growth in the demand for the most educated
workers and the fastest falls in demand for workers with intermediate levels of ed-
ucation. The magnitudes are nontrivial: technical change can account for up to a
relied on.
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quarter of the growth of the college wage bill share in the economy as a whole (and
more in the tradable sectors).
Although our method is simple and transparent, there are many extensions that
need to be made. First, alternative instrumental variables for ICT would help iden-
tify the causal impact of ICT. Second, although we find no direct role for trade vari-
ables, there may be other ways in which globalization influences the labour market,
for example by causing firms to “defensively innovate” (Acemoglu (2003)). Third,
there are alternative explanations for the improved performance of the least skilled
group through for example, greater demand from richer skilled workers for the ser-
vices they provide as market production substitutes for household production (e.g.
childcare, eating out in restaurants, domestic work, etc.)23. These explanations may
complement the mechanism that we address here. Finally, we have not used richer
occupational data that would focus on the skill content of tasks due to the need
to have international comparability across countries. The work of Autor and Dorn
(2009) is an important contribution here.
23Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Mazzolari and Ragusa (2008)
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Appendix A
Figures: Chapter 1
Figure A.1 Allocation of SC seats to a district
Figure A.2 Identification of District Cutoff
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Figure A.3 Identification of constituencies close to the threshold
Figure A.4 Discarding previously-reserved constituencies
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Figure A.5 Identification of Treatment and Control Groups
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Appendix B
Tables: Chapter 1
Table B.1: Constituency Averages: Chhatisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and
Rajasthan 2001
Treated Untreated Difference
Observations 38 69
Total Population 32729 45679 -12950
(12417) (10558) (16276)
Fraction of Scheduled Castes (SC) 0.21 0.20 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Fraction of Scheduled Tribes (ST) 0.11 0.09 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Fraction of Females 0.48 0.48 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Fraction of Illiterates 0.53 0.53 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Employed as a Fraction of Total Population 0.47 0.48 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Notes: top row: Averages at constituency level. Standard error clustered at constituency level in
parentheses. All data taken from the 2001 Census data for Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh,
Karnataka and Rajasthan.
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Table B.2: Constituency Electoral Characteristics
Treated Untreated Difference
Observations 38 69
Panel A: Constituency Electoral Characteristics at Baseline: 2003 and 2004
Electors 168060 165826 2234
(3475) (2740) (4419)
Female candidates 0.05 0.06 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Candidates from Right-wing Parties 0.11 0.14 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Candidates from Left/Centre-Left Parties 0.16 0.19 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Candidates from Lower-Caste Parties 0.14 0.10 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Female candidates winning 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Candidates from Right-wing Parties winning 0.53 0.57 -0.04
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10)
Candidates from Left/Centre-Left Parties winning 0.18 0.33 -0.15
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Candidates from Lower-Caste Parties winning 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Panel B: Constituency Electoral Characteristics in 2008
Electors 170311 172300 -1990
(3682) (2510) (4447)
Female candidates 0.08 0.06 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Candidates from Right-wing Parties 0.09 0.11 -0.01
(0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
Candidates from Left/Centre-Left Parties 0.11 0.14 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Candidates from Lower-Caste Parties 0.13 0.13 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female candidates winning 0.18 0.14 0.04
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08)
Candidates from Right-wing Parties winning 0.63 0.41 0.23
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10)
Candidates from Left/Centre-Left Parties winning 0.26 0.46 -0.20
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Candidates from Lower-Caste Parties winning 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Notes: Standard error of mean in parentheses. All data taken from the 2003 and 2004 Election
Commission of India State Legislative Assembly Results for Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan and Karnataka.”Left” parties are: the Communist Party of India (and offshoots) and the
Indian National Congress; ”Right” parties: the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); ”Lower-caste” parties:
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).
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Table B.3: Averages of Dependent Variables
Pre Post Difference
Turnout
Treated 0.69 0.63 -0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Untreated 0.70 0.70 0.00
(0.01 (0.01) (0.00)
Difference -0.01 -0.07 -0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log (Candidates/Electors)
Treated 3.94 4.23 0.30
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Untreated 3.86 4.07 0.22
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Difference 0.08 0.16 0.08
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Margin of Victory
Treated 0.11 0.11 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Untreated 0.12 0.09 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Difference 0.00 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Right-wing candidates winning
Treated 0.53 0.63 0.11
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
Untreated 0.57 0.41 -0.16
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Difference -0.04 0.23 0.26
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
Centre/Centre-Left candidates winning
Treated 0.18 0.26 0.08
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Untreated 0.33 0.46 0.13
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Difference -0.15 -0.20 -0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
Lower-Caste party candidates winning
Treated 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Untreated 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Difference 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Notes: Number of Treated Constituencies: 38. Number of Untreated Constituencies: 69. Standard
error of mean in parentheses. All data taken from the 2003, 2004 and 2008 Election Commission of
India State Legislative Assembly Results for Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and
Karnataka.”Right” parties: the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Candidates/Electors multiplied
everywhere by 1000000.
95
Table B.4: Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections from
2001-2008)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Turnout
Reserved Constituency -0.04*** -0.01 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post Reservation -0.02*** 0.00 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.70***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
District FE Y
Observations 214 214 214 214
R-squared 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.73
Panel B: Log (Candidates/Electors)
Reserved Constituency 0.12* 0.08 0.03
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Post Reservation 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation 0.08 0.08
(0.08) (0.10)
Constant -9.81*** -9.97*** -9.96***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
District FE Y
Observations 214 214 214 214
R-squared 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.56
Panel C: Margin of Victory
Reserved Constituency 0.01 -0.005 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Post Reservation -0.02 -0.03* -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Constant 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.12***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
District FE Y
Observations 214 214 214 214
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.36
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. I define constituencies as eligible for reservation if they have
a fraction of SCs no higher than 3 percentage points more than the minimum fraction of SCs in
SC-reserved constituencies within a district. Candidates/Electors multiplied everywhere by
1000000.
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Table B.5: Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections from
2001-2008) on Incidence of Victory of Party Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Right-Wing
Reserved Constituency -0.04 0.08 -0.10
(0.10) (0.11) (0.26)
Post Reservation -0.16* -0.16* -0.40*
(0.08) (0.10) (0.21)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation 0.26** 0.26* 0.67**
(0.13) (0.15) (0.34)
Constant 0.52*** 0.57*** 0.16
(0.04) (0.06) (0.15)
Specification OLS OLS OLS PROBIT
District FE Y
Observations 214 214 214 99
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.34 0.02
Panel B: Centre/Centre-Left
Reserved Constituency -0.15* -0.21** -0.47*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.28)
Post Reservation 0.13 0.13 0.34
(0.08) (0.09) (0.21)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation -0.05 -0.05 -0.07
(0.13) (0.15) (0.40)
Constant 0.34*** 0.33*** -0.51***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.16)
Specification OLS OLS OLS PROBIT
District FE Y
Observations 214 214 214 99
R-squared 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.043
Panel C: Lower-Caste Parties
Reserved Constituency 0.01 -0.02 0.25
(0.03) (0.03) (0.58)
Post Reservation -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.56)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.83)
Constant 0.02** 0.01 -2.18***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.39)
Specification OLS OLS OLS PROBIT
District FE Y
Observations 214 214 214 99
R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.37 0.01
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. I define constituencies as eligible for reservation if they have
a fraction of SCs no higher than 3 percentage points more than the minimum fraction of SCs in
SC-reserved constituencies within a district.
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Table B.6: Effect of dereservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections from
2001-2008)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnout Log(Candidates Margin of Victory
/Electors)
Reserved Constituency 0.00 0.03 -0.02
(0.01) (0.08) (0.02)
Post Reservation 0.00 0.01 0.22*** 0.18 -0.03* -0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.12) (0.02) (0.04)
Reserved Constituency -0.06*** 0.08 0.02
Post Reservation (0.01) (0.10) (0.03)
Dereserved Constituency 0.06*** -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.21) (0.03)
Dereserved Constituency 0.04** 0.43** 0.03
Post Dereservation (0.02) (0.18) (0.05)
Observations 214 99 214 99 214 99
R-squared 0.73 0.87 0.56 0.68 0.3 0.38
Right-Wing Centre/Centre-Left Lower-Caste
Parties Parties Parties
Reserved Constituency 0.08 -0.21 -0.02
(0.11) (0.10) (0.03)
Post Reservation -0.16* -0.24 0.13 0.29 0.00 0.00
(0.1) (0.20) (0.09) (0.20) (0.02) (0.00)
Reserved Constituency 0.26* -0.05 -0.00
Post Reservation (0.16) (0.15) (0.05)
Dereserved Constituency -0.07 0.04 -0.04
(0.22) (0.22) (0.03)
Dereserved Constituency 0.09 -0.22 0.07
Post Dereservation (0.27) (0.27) (0.07)
Observations 214 99 214 99 214 99
R-squared 0.35 0.44 0.33 0.39 0.36 0.53
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. I define constituencies as eligible for reservation if they have
a fraction of SCs no higher than 3 percentage points more than the minimum fraction of SCs in
SC-reserved constituencies within a district. All regressions have district and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by constituency. Candidates/Electors multiplied everywhere by
1000000.
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Table B.7: Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections from
1993-1999)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Turnout
Reserved Constituency 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post Reservation 0.00 0.00 0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Period: 2003-2008 Y Y
Sample: Constituencies with Available Data for 1993-1999 Y Y
Period: 1993-199 Y
Observations 214 204 204
R-squared 0.73 0.72 0.75
Panel B: Log (Number of Candidates/Electors)
Reserved Constituency 0.03 0.04 -0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Post Reservation 0.22*** 0.22*** -0.73***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation 0.08 0.10 0.17
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
Period: 2003-2008 Y Y
Sample: Constituencies with Available Data for 1993-1999 Y Y
Period: 1993-199 Y
Observations 214 204 204
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.69
Panel C: Margin of Victory
Reserved Constituency -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Post Reservation -0.03* -0.03* 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Period: 2003-2008 Y Y
Sample: Constituencies with available data for 1993-1999 Y Y
Period: 1993-1999 Y
Observations 214 204 204
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.33
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. I define constituencies as eligible for reservation if they have
a fraction of SCs no higher than 3 percentage points more than the minimum fraction of SCs in
SC-reserved constituencies within a district. All regressions have district fixed effects.
Candidates/Electors multiplied everywhere by 1000000.99
Table B.8: Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 on success of
political parties (Elections from 1993-1999)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Right-wing Parties
Reserved Constituency 0.08 0.07 -0.12
(0.11) (0.12) (0.09)
Post Reservation -0.16* -0.17* -0.12
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation 0.26* 0.31* 0.15
(0.15) (0.16) (0.14)
Period: 2003-2008 Y Y
Sample: Constituencies with Available Data for 1993-1999 Y Y
Period: 1993-199 Y
Observations 214 204 204
R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.40
Panel B: Left/Centre-Left Parties
Reserved Constituency -0.21** -0.22** 0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Post Reservation 0.13 0.14 0.21**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation -0.05 -0.05 0.01
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Period: 2003-2008 Y Y
Sample: Constituencies with Available Data for 1993-1999 Y Y
Period: 1993-199 Y
Observations 214 204 204
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.40
Panel C: Lower-Caste Parties
Reserved Constituency -0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Post Reservation 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation -0.00 0.03 -0.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Period: 2003-2008 Y Y
Sample: Constituencies with available data for 1993-1999 Y Y
Period: 1993-1999 Y
Observations 214 204 204
R-squared 0.36 0.33 0.50
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. I define constituencies as eligible for reservation if they have
a fraction of SCs no higher than 3 percentage points more than the minimum fraction of SCs in
SC-reserved constituencies within a district. All regressions have district fixed effects.
Candidates/Electors multiplied everywhere by 1000000.100
Table B.9: Effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) in 2008 (Elections from
2001-2008): 5% cutoff
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Turnout Log (Candidates/Electors) Margin of Victory
Reserved Constituency -0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
Post Reservation 0.01** 0.26*** -0.01
(0.003) (0.03) (0.01)
Reserved Constituency Post Reservation -0.06*** 0.04 0.003
(0.01) (0.08) (0.02)
Constant 0.70*** 3.90*** 0.10***
(0.005) (0.03) (0.01)
Observations 357 357 357
R-squared 0.09 0.1 0.01
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. I define constituencies as eligible for reservation if they have
a fraction of SCs no higher than 5 percentage points more than the minimum fraction of SCs in
SC-reserved constituencies within a district. All regressions have district fixed effects.
Candidates/Electors multiplied everywhere by 1000000.
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Table B.11: Respondent Characteristics: Lokniti Constituencies, Karnataka Post-Poll
Treated Untreated Difference
Number of respondents 405 497
Fraction of SC respondents 0.16 0.15 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Fraction of ST respondents 0.02 0.03 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Fraction of Minority respondents 0.29 0.33 -0.04
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Fraction of Upper-caste Hindu respondents 0.71 0.67 0.04
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Fraction of Female respondents 0.49 0.42 0.06
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Fraction of Illiterate respondents 0.25 0.32 -0.07
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Number of Cows/buffaloes 2.06 1.92 0.14
(0.28) (0.36) (0.44)
Monthly Household Income (INR) 2329.02 2920.52 -591.50
(221.99) (665.46) (682.84)
Age of respondent 41.63 42.23 -0.59
(0.78) (1.04) (1.25)
Number of children in household 2.42 2.36 0.06
(0.22) (0.17) (0.26)
Right supporters 0.31 0.26 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Voted in 2004 0.94 0.87 0.07
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Uninformed voters .16 0.20 -0.04
(.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Standard errors in parentheses. All data taken from the Lokniti 2008 Post-Poll Survey in Karnataka.
Constituencies were chosen among those which were close to the district cutoff for reservation.
These are: Hungund, Aurad, Kanakagiri, Koppal, Ron, Hanagal, Hadagalli, Sira, Gowribidanur,
Sidlaghatta,Mulbagal,Hosakote,Kanakapura,Sakleshpur and Nanjangud.”Uninformed” refers to
respondents who said that they never read newspapers, watched news on TV or listened to news on
radio
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Table B.12: Constituency Averages at Baseline: Karnataka 2001
Treated Untreated Difference
Observations 1420 1827
Total Population 1128.08 1419.452 -291.37
(339.11) (178.01) (364.55)
Fraction of Scheduled Castes (SC) 0.25 0.21 0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Fraction of Scheduled Tribes (ST) 0.06 0.08 -0.02
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Fraction of Females 0.50 0.49 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fraction of Illiterates 0.48 0.48 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Employed as a Fraction of Total Population 0.50 0.51 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Employed Males as a Fraction of Total Males 0.59 0.59 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Notes: Top row: Characteristics averaged across villages/towns/sub-districts. Standard errors in
parentheses. All data taken from the 2001 Census data for Karnataka.Constituencies were chosen
among those which were close to the district cutoff for reservation. These are: Hungund, Aurad,
Kanakagiri, Koppal, Ron, Hanagal, Hadagalli, Sira, Gowribidanur,
Sidlaghatta,Mulbagal,Hosakote,Kanakapura,Sakleshpur and Nanjangud.
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Table B.13: Candidate Characteristics (Lokniti constituencies)
Treated Untreated Difference
Baseline: Karnataka 2004
Observations 52 59
Scheduled Caste (SC) candidates 0.13 0.05 0.08
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Scheduled Tribe (ST) candidates 0.06 0.00 0.07
(0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
Female candidates 0.04 0.07 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Candidates from Centre/Centre-Left Parties 0.13 0.15 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Candidates from Right Parties 0.10 0.14 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Candidates from Lower-Caste Parties 0.08 0.05 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
After Treatment: Karnataka 2008
Observations 81 90
Female candidates 0.01 0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Candidates from Centre/Centre-Left Parties 0.12 0.15 -0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Candidates from Right Parties 0.10 0.13 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Candidates from Lower-Caste Parties 0.07 0.02 0.05
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Notes: Standard error of mean in parentheses. All data taken from the 2004 and 2008 Election
Commission of India State Legislative Assembly Results for Karnataka. Constituencies were chosen
among those which were close to the district cutoff for reservation. These are: Hungund, Aurad,
Kanakagiri, Koppal, Ron, Hanagal, Hadagalli, Sira, Gowribidanur,
Sidlaghatta,Hosakote,Sakleshpur, Mulbagal, Kanakapura and Nanjangud.”Left” parties are: the
Communist Party of India (and offshoots) and the Indian national Congress; ”Right” parties: the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); ”Lower-caste” parties: the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).
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Appendix C
Data Appendix: Chapter 1
I use three chief sources to arrive at descriptive statistics or controls in the main
regressions: the Primary Census Abstracts from the 2001 Census of India; constituency-
level electoral data for the State Legislative Assembly Elections from the Election
Commission of India (Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan: 2003 and 2008;
Karnataka:2004 and 2008) and individual voting data from the 2008 Karnataka Post-
Poll Survey, released by Lokniti and the Centre for the Study of Developing Soci-
eties.
To arrive at constituency controls, I match each village or town in a district to
a constituency (Concordance available on request). The 2008 round of delimitation
stated explicitly that every constituency would be wholly contained in one district.
The Delimitation guidelines set out the extent of each constituency. I match every
unit (village, town, ward or other administrative unit) to its corresponding con-
stituency, and then assign it to its ”2008” district. This might be of some concern
if new districts are created by merging parts of others together, or other substan-
tial redrawing of boundaries. For the most part, however (and certainly within my
sample), new districts are created by splitting an existing district into two or three,
so each district in 2008 has exactly one analogue in previous years. I am taking the
extent of each constituency as laid out in the 2008 Delimitation document. I do not
find evidence of any other substantial redefinition of constituency limits. I assume
that gerrymandering, where it exists, is either limited or not biased towards either
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reserved or unreserved constituencies. This is borne out by the survey carried out
by Iyer and Shivakumar (2009), who find that Delimitation arranged constituencies
to even out the population of each constituency, without visible party or political
bias.
In the individual-level voting data from Lokniti, I remove missing observations:
those who were too young to vote in 2004 or 2008, or do not remember whether they
voted in either year.
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Appendix D
Proofs of Propositions: Chapter 2
D.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. I consider in turn an interior h¯ and then h¯ = c−1(1) and h¯ = 0.
• Consider first ¯h(I0) = 0.
u( f (h)(1− c(h′)))− (1− pi)u( f (h)) = −pi I
=⇒ piu( f (h)) = −pi I
=⇒ h = 0&I = 0&pi = 0
=⇒ h¯ > 0∀h > 0, ∀I1 > I0
=⇒ h¯ ≥ 0, h = 0
• Next, consider ¯h(I0) = c−1(1)
u( f (h)(1− c(h¯)))− (1− pi)u( f (h)) ≥ −pi I
=⇒ −(1− pi)u( f (h)) ≥ −pi I
=⇒ ¯h(I1) ≥ c−1(1)∀I1 > I0
• Finally consider an interior h¯ i.e. 0 < h¯ < c−1(1). If h¯ = c−1[1 − 1/ f (h) ·
109
u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]:
∂h¯
∂I
= (c−1)′[1− 1
f (h)
· u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]
·[− 1
f (h)
· (u−1)′((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)] · (−pi) > 0
• To prove concavity of interior h¯: if (c−1)′(.) > 0, (c−1)′′(.) < 0, (u−1)′(.) >
0, (u−1)′′(.) > 0
∂2h¯
∂I2
= (c−1)′′[1− 1
f (h)
· (u−1)′((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]
·[(u−1)′((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]2 · pi
2
( f (h))2
+(c−1)′[1− 1
f (h)
· u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]
·(u−1)′′((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)] · −pi
2
f (h)
≤ 0
• If ¯h(I0) = 0, ¯h(I1) ∈ {0, c−1[1− 1f (h) · u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)], c−1(1)}
D.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. I consider in turn an interior h¯ and then h¯ = c−1(1) and h¯ = 0.
• Consider first ¯h(pi0) = 0.
u( f (h)(1− c(h′)))− (1− pi)u( f (h)) = −pi I
=⇒ piu( f (h)) = −pi I
=⇒ h = 0&I = 0∨ pi = 0
=⇒ h¯ = 0,pi = 0
=⇒ h¯ > 0∀pi1 > pi0
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• Next, consider ¯h(pi0) = c−1(1)
u( f (h)(1− c(h¯)))− (1− pi)u( f (h)) ≥ −pi I
=⇒ −(1− pi)u( f (h)) ≥ −pi I
=⇒ ¯h(pi1) ≥ c−1(1)∀pi1 > pi0
• Finally consider an interior h¯ i.e. 0 < h¯ < c−1(1). If h¯ = c−1[1 − 1/ f (h) ·
u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]:
∂h¯
∂pi
= (c−1)′[1− 1
f (h)
· u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]
·[− 1
f (h)
· (u−1)′((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)] · (−u( f (h))− I) > 0
• To prove concavity of interior h¯: if (c−1)′(.) > 0, (c−1)′′(.) < 0, (u−1)′(.) >
0, (u−1)′′(.) > 0
∂2h¯
∂pi2
= (c−1)′′[1− 1
f (h)
· (u−1)′((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]
·[(u−1)′((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]2 · (u( f (h)) + I)
2
( f (h))2
+(c−1)′[1− 1
f (h)
· u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)]
·(u−1)′′((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)] · −(u( f (h)) + I)
2
f (h)
≤ 0
• If ¯h(I0) = 0, ¯h(I1) ∈ {0, c−1[1− 1f (h) · u−1((1− pi) · u( f (h))− pi · I)], c−1(1)}
D.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 3. I consider in turn h¯ = 0, h¯ = c−1(1) and interior h¯.
• Consider first c(h¯) = 1, h1 > h0 > 0, I > 0. Keeping I constant, if surplus over
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autarky at h0, c(h′(h0)) is the same as that at h1, c(h′(h1)):
u( f (h1)(1− c(h′(h1))))− (1− pi) · u( f (h1)) = −pi · I
= u( f (h0)(1− c(h′(h0))))
−(1− pi) · u( f (h0))
= −(1− pi) · u( f (h0))
c(h¯) = 1 =⇒ u( f (h1)(1− c(h′(h1)))) > 0
=⇒ c(h′(h1)) < c(h′(h0))
=⇒ h′(h1) < h′(h0)
• Consider next I=0. Then:
u( f (h)(1− c(h′)))− (1− pi)u( f (h)) = −pi · I =⇒ h = 0∨ h′ = 0
• Consider finally h1 > h0 > 0. 0 < h1 < c−1(1). Keeping I constant, if sur-
plus over autarky at h0, c(h′(h0)) is the same as that at h1, c(h′(h1)). f ′(h) >
0, f ′′(h) ≤ 0, c′(h) > 0, c′′(h) > 0, therefore:
h¯(h1) ≥ h¯(h0) =⇒ u( f (h1)(1− c(h¯(h1))))− (1− pi) · u( f (h1))
< u( f (h0)(1− c(h¯(h0))))− (1− pi) · u( f (h0))
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D.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 4. Note that with the assumptions of stationarity above (i.e. that
the lowest acceptable transfer of human capital at I is h˜), one can rewrite the parent’s
decision problem as:
U(h′) = max
h′
u( f (h)(1− c(h′)))
+λ{(1− pi) · u( f (h′)) + pi · u( f (h′)− I)
+βu( f (h′)(1− c(h′)))− u( f (h′)) + β · pi · I}
i.e. If ∃h′ at which the child finds it (weakly) optimal to honestly insure the
parent and then choose insurance herself, her child will also find it weakly optimal
to accept h′′ = h′.
First Order Conditions with respect to h′ suggest that:
λ =
u′( f (h)(1− c(h′))) f (h)c′(h′)
pi · u′( f (h′)− θ · I) f ′(h′)− pi · u′( f (h′)) + β ∂∂h′u( f (h′)(1− c(h′)))
> 0 (D.1)
The denominator is the partial derivative of the child’s surplus over cheating
when h′ = h′′, which, by assumption, is positive.
If constrained first-best is achieved, then keeping λ constant and taking the par-
tial derivative with respect to I:
∂h′
∂I
=
A
B + C + D + E + F + G + H + J
∈ (0, 1)
Where
A = θ · λpi · u′′( f (h′)− θ · I) f ′(h′) < 0
B = − f (h)c′′(h′)u′( f (h)(1− c(h′)))
C = ( f (h)c′(h′))2 · u′′( f (h)(1− c(h′)))
D = −λ · pi · u′( f (h′)) f ′′(h′)
E = −λ · pi · u′′( f (h′))( f ′(h′))2
F = λ · pi · u′( f (h′)− θ · I) f ′′(h′)
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G = λ · pi · u′′( f (h′)− θ · I)( f ′(h′))2
H = λ · β · u′( f (h′)(1− c(h′))( f ′′(h′)− 2 f ′(h′)c′(h′)− f ′(h′)c′′(h′))
J = λ · β · u′′( f (h′)(1− c(h′))( f ′(h′)(1− c(h′)))2
Since u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0, f ′(.) > 0, f ′′(.) < 0, c′(.) > 0, c′′(.) < 0
D.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof of Proposition 5. If constrained first-best is achieved, then keeping λ constant
and taking the partial derivative with respect to θ, from Equation D.1:
∂h′
∂θ
=
A
B + C + D + E + F + G + H + J
∈ (0, 1)
Where
A = I · λpi · u′′( f (h′)− θ · I) f ′(h′) < 0
B = − f (h)c′′(h′)u′( f (h)(1− c(h′)))
C = ( f (h)c′(h′))2 · u′′( f (h)(1− c(h′)))
D = −λ · pi · u′( f (h′)) f ′′(h′)
E = −λ · pi · u′′( f (h′))( f ′(h′))2
F = λ · pi · u′( f (h′)− θ · I) f ′′(h′)
G = λ · pi · u′′( f (h′)− θ · I)( f ′(h′))2
H = λ · β · u′( f (h′)(1− c(h′))( f ′′(h′)− 2 f ′(h′)c′(h′)− f ′(h′)c′′(h′))
J = λ · β · u′′( f (h′)(1− c(h′))( f ′(h′)(1− c(h′)))2
Since u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0, f ′(.) > 0, f ′′(.) < 0, c′(.) > 0, c′′(.) < 0
D.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof of Proposition 6. If constrained first-best is achieved, then keeping λ constant
and taking the partial derivative with respect to pi, using Equation D.1:
∂h′
∂pi
=
A′
B′ + C′ + D′ + E′ + F′ + G′ + H′ + J′
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Where
A = λ f ′(h′)[u′( f (h′))− u′( f (h′)− θ I)] < 0
B = − f (h)c′′(h′)u′( f (h)(1− c(h′)))
C = ( f (h)c′(h′))2 · u′′( f (h)(1− c(h′)))
D = −λ · pi · u′( f (h′)) f ′′(h′)
E = −λ · pi · u′′( f (h′))( f ′(h′))2
F = λ · pi · u′( f (h′)− θ · I) f ′′(h′)
G = λ · pi · u′′( f (h′)− θ · I)( f ′(h′))2
H = λ · β · u′( f (h′)(1− c(h′))( f ′′(h′)− 2 f ′(h′)c′(h′)− f ′(h′)c′′(h′))
J = λ · β · u′′( f (h′)(1− c(h′))( f ′(h′)(1− c(h′)))2
Since u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0, f ′(.) > 0, f ′′(.) < 0, c′(.) > 0, c′′(.) < 0
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Appendix E
Figures: Chapter 2
Figure E.1 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: h=.18
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Figure E.2 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: h=.5
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Figure E.3 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: I=0.01
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Figure E.4 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: I=0.5
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Figure E.5 Maximum Human Capital Transferred to Child: I=0.99
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Figure E.6 Maximum Human Capital Transfer
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Figure E.7 Lower Bound of Maximum Human Capital Transfer
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Figure E.8 Minimum Human Capital Transfer Accepted by Child
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Figure E.9 Difference Between Maximum and Minimum Sustainable Human Capi-
tal Transfers
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Appendix F
Figures: Chapter 3
Figure F.1 Cross Country Variation in Growth of High-skilled Wage Bill Shares and
ICT Intensity, 1980- 2004
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Figure F.2 Cross Country Variation in Growth of Medium-skilled Wage Bill Shares
and ICT Intensity, 1980- 2004
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Figure F.3 Cross Country Variation in Growth of Low-skilled Wage Bill Shares and
ICT Intensity, 1980- 2004
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Figure F.4 Average Annual Percentage Point Changes in High, Medium and Low-
Skilled Wage Bill Shares over Six- Year Intervals from 1980-2004 (Eleven Country
Average)
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Figure F.5 Average Annual Percentage Point Changes in High, Medium and Low-
Skilled Wage Bill Shares over Six- Year Intervals from 1980-2004 (U.S. Average)
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Figure F.6 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of High-Skilled Wage-Bill Share and
ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Whole Economy)
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Figure F.7 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of High-Skilled Wage-Bill Share and
ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Traded Goods Only)
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Figure F.8 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of Medium-Skilled Wage-Bill Share
and ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Whole Economy)
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Figure F.9 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of Medium-Skilled Wage-Bill Share
and ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Traded Goods Only)
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Figure F.10 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of Low-Skilled Wage-Bill Share and
ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Whole Economy)
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Figure F.11 Cross-Industry Variation in Growth of Low-Skilled Wage-Bill Share and
ICT Intensity, 1980-2004 (11 Country Means: Traded Goods Only)
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Appendix G
Tables: Chapter 3
Table G.1: Mean Standardized Scores by skill group - 1980 US data
High- Middle- Low-
Skilled Skilled Skilled
Routine Tasks
Cognitive Set limits, Tolerances -0.32 0.06 0.07
or Standards
Manual Finger Dexterity -0.21 0.13 -0.14
Non-routine tasks
Cognitive Quantitative reasoning 0.79 -0.02 -0.43
requirements
Direction, Control 0.90 -0.11 -0.32
and Planning
Manual Eye-Hand-Foot -0.36 -0.04 0.29
coordination
Note: This table reports the mean standardized task measures by skill group, using 1980 US Census
micro data and the occ8090 classification from Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). For each task
measure, the standardized measure is derived by subtracting from each occupation’s task score the
weighted mean task score across all occupations, and then dividing the difference by the standard
deviation of the task measure across the 453 occupations.
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Table G.6: Changes in Wage Bill Shares: 1980-2004
Panel A:Dependent variable: High-Skilled Wage Bill Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ((ICT capital) 72.29*** 64.56*** 46.92*** 163.94*** 139.6*** 128.71***
/ (Value Added)) (18.28) (17.31) (14.94) (45.48) (42.74) (32.19)
∆ ln(Value Added) 5.42*** 4.76*** 3.26 3.41***
(1.24) (0.95) (2.25) (1.07)
∆ ((Non ICT capital) -7.64 -6.45* 0.31 -0.47
/ (Value Added)) (4.92) (3.51) (5.59) (2.45)
Intercept 10.02*** 8.69*** 2.22 9.12*** 6.42*** 4.04*
(0.57) (0.63) (1.67) (0.86) (1.02) (2.19)
Country fixed effects X X
Sample: All industries X X X X
Sample: Traded industries X X X X
Obs. 208 208 208 208 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.09 0.19 0.45 0.19 0.22 0.81
Panel B:Dependent variable: Medium-Skilled Wage Bill Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ((ICT capital)) -100.78*** -77.76*** -64.52*** -163.98 -41.59 -288.01***
/ (Value Added) (30.21) (25.44) (20.24) (115.77) (84.73) (83.94)
∆ ln(Value Added) -13.8*** -15.33*** -15.64*** -7.96**
(2.69) (2.23) (4.27) (3.14)
∆ ((Non ICT capital) 9.76 18.01* -10.79 1.57
/ (Value Added)) (11.88) (10.25) (14.08) (10.98)
Intercept 8.73*** 10.59*** 27.24*** 15.5*** 18.20*** 29.75***
(1.29) (1.49) (3.73) (1.90) (2.95) (4.67)
Country fixed effects X X
Sample: All industries X X X X
Sample: Traded industries X X X X
Obs. 208 208 208 208 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.05 0.23 0.58 0.05 0.25 0.74
Panel C:Dependent variable: Low-Skilled Wage Bill Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ((ICT capital)) 28.55 13.21 17.71 0.50 -97.91 159.65**
/ (Value Added) (27.34) (25.66) (16.41) (113.51) (100.71) (79.30)
∆ ln(Value Added) 8.43*** 10.62*** 12.45*** 4.61
(2.40) (1.95) (4.24) (3.30)
∆ ((Non ICT capital) -2.21 -11.68 10.32 -1.28
/ (Value Added)) (9.63) (9.07) (11.91) (11.73)
Intercept -18.74*** -19.26*** -29.5*** -24.61*** -24.62*** -33.84***
(1.12) (1.31) (3.27) (1.68) (2.55) (3.95)
Country fixed effects X X
Sample: All industries X X X X
Sample: Traded industries X X X X
Obs. 208 208 208 208 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.00 0.10 0.65 0.00 0.16 0.70
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Coefficients estimated by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Columns (1)-(4) are estimated on all industries and columns (5)-(8) are on the tradable sectors.
Weights in columns (1)-(4): each industry’s 1980 share of each country’s employment.
Weights in columns (5)-(8):each industry’s 1980 share of each country’s employment in traded industries.
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Table G.7: Changes in Wage Bill Shares: 1980-2004 - Robustness checks
Panel A: Dependent variable: High-Skilled Wage Bill Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆ ((ICT capital) 46.92*** 42.09*** 50.98*** 48.79*** 132.84** 66.1 121.63** 103.16** 137.99 65.31
/ (Value Added)) (14.94) (14.66) (16.64) (16.20) (52.59) (58.15) (53.43) (48.82) (119.44) (104.60)
∆ ln(Value Added) 4.76*** 2.93** 5.79*** 4.4** 0.26 -1.97 4.24*** 4.85*** 4.12*** 5.09***
(0.95) (1.39) (1.31) (1.93) (2.94) (3.79) (1.07) (1.10) (1.30) (1.20)
∆ ((Non ICT capital) -6.45* -5.06 -9.25** -8.19 15.41 2.56 -8.47** -9.85** -8.91* -8.54
/ (Value Added)) (3.51) (3.99) (4.56) (5.13) (12.99) (12.94) (4.02) (4.33) (5.01) (5.16)
1980 High-skilled 0.06 0.04 0.34*
wage bill share (0.06) (0.07) (0.19)
1980 Medium-skilled 0.12** 0.08 0.6**
wage bill share (0.05) (0.07) (0.27)
Country fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Sample All All Continental Continental USA USA All All All All
Europe Europe except USA except USA
Obs. 208 208 143 143 27 27 208 181 208 181
R-squared 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.21 0.43 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.46
F-stat for excluded instrument 10.5 9.6 6.5 8.3
in the first stage
Panel B: Dependent variable: Medium-Skilled Wage Bill Share
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆ ((ICT capital) -64.52*** -41.72*** -62.13*** -51.41*** -160.15*** -80.06 -73.81 -46.74 -42.8 22.21
/ (Value Added)) (20.24) (13.35) (18.79) (14.28) (44.52) (60.97) (56.75) (49.04) (235.73) (224.74)
∆ ln(Value Added) -15.33*** -2.73 -16.33*** -4.36 -7.57** 0.45 -15.26*** -16.24*** -15.48*** -16.67***
(2.23) (1.99) (3.13) (2.83) (3.32) (3.64) (2.30) (2.47) (2.27) (2.34)
∆ ((Non ICT capital) 18.01* 3.89 21.33 7.82 -16.58 -7.9 18.26* 20.02* 17.42 17.62
/ (Value Added)) (10.25) (6.61) (13.38) (9.27) (17.77) (13.85) (10.59) (11.41) (11.34) (12.81)
1980 High-skilled -0.55*** -0.48*** -0.72***
wage bill share (0.08) (0.08) (0.19)
1980 Medium-skilled -0.64*** -0.57*** -0.95***
wage bill share (0.07) (0.09) (0.28)
Country fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Sample All All Continental Continental USA USA All All All All
Europe Europe except USA except USA
Obs. 208 208 143 143 27 27 208 181 208 181
R-squared 0.58 0.79 0.59 0.77 0.36 0.68 0.58 0.78 0.58 0.52
F-stat for excluded instrument 10.5 9.6 6.5 8.3
in the first stage
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Coefficients estimated by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions
weighted by the industry’s 1980 share of each country’s employment. In columns (7) and (8) we
instrument the 25-year difference in ICT Capital/Value Added by the 1980 levels of ICT
capital/Value Added in the USA. In columns (9) and (10) we instrument the 25-year difference in
ICT Capital/Value Added by the 1980 levels of routine task input using the 1991 Directory of
Occupational Titles (constructed as in Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)).
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Table G.9: Trade and Technology
Panel A: Dependent variable: High-Skilled Wage Bill Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆ ((Imports+ Exports)) 0.59 0.71*** 0.59*** 0.50** 0.24 0.11
/ (Value Added)) (0.46) (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.30) (0.25)
∆ ((ICT capital) 107.61*** 94.25*** 73.59** 75.49** 47.21*** 96.63*** 72.37**
/ (Value Added)) (31.70) (34.07) (31.41) (31.10) (15.20) (33.05) (30.80)
∆ ln(Value Added) 4.09*** 3.84*** 4.03*** 2.57* 2.36* 5.61*** 4.16*** 2.98*
(1.09) (1.26) (1.38) (1.52) (1.35) (1.05) (1.30) (1.52)
∆ ((Non ICT capital) -0.63 0.16 0.97 1.03 -6.23* 0.06 0.85
/ (Value Added)) (2.41) (3.41) (3.12) (3.02) (3.51) (3.45) (3.18)
1980 (Research and Development 34.18* 28.04 30.08** 25.76
Expenditure/Value Added) (18.23) (17.59) (14.91) (16.00)
∆ (Imported 16.40** 8.78** 4.27
Intermediate inputs) (7.00) (3.47) (2.82)
Intercept 8.6***
(0.60)
Country fixed effects X X X X X X X X X
Sample: Traded goods (all countries) X X X
Sample: Traded goods (except Austria and Spain) X X X X X X
Sample: All goods (all countries) X
Obs. 84 84 84 65 65 65 65 208 65 65
R-squared 0.02 0.67 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.46 0.76 0.78
Panel B: Dependent variable: Medium-Skilled Wage Bill Share
∆ ((Imports+ Exports)) -1.18 -1.26* -0.95* -0.95* -0.77 -0.49
/ (Value Added)) (0.91) (0.75) (0.57) (0.52) (0.63) (0.52)
∆ ((ICT capital) -253.80*** -294.15*** -269.46*** -277.86*** -64.78*** -309.49*** -274.20***
/ (Value Added)) (83.12) (69.28) (69.36) (69.49) (20.44) (69.40) (69.54)
∆ ln(Value Added) -9.07** -7.07** -9.34*** -5.55* -4.61* -16.08*** -7.06** -5.34
(3.42) (2.92) (3.18) (3.18) (2.64) (2.56) (3.12) (3.31)
∆ ((Non ICT capital) 1.84 24.10** 23.14** 22.86** 17.81* 24.22** 23.07**
/ (Value Added)) (10.75) (10.03) (10.59) (10.62) (10.16) (10.25) (10.72)
1980 (Research and Development -60.72** -33.51* -42.55** -37.47**
Expenditure/Value Added) (25.89) (19.24) (17.22) (18.20)
∆ (Imported -14.49 -11.58 -5.02
Intermediate inputs) (13.56) (9.87) (7.93)
Intercept 16.52***
(2.21)
Country fixed effects X X X X X X X X X
Sample: Traded goods (all countries) X X X
Sample: Traded goods (except Austria and Spain) X X X X X X
Sample: All goods (all countries) X
Obs. 84 84 84 65 65 65 65 208 65 65
R-squared 0.02 0.55 0.75 0.81 0.73 0.82 0.81 0.58 0.76 0.77
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coefficients estimated by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by
the industry’s 1980 share of each country’s employment, for traded goods (columns 1-7) and for all
goods (column 8). The OECD ANBERD dataset does not have R&D data for Austria and Spain,
which are dropped from the sample (columns (4)-(7)). In column 8, we construct the imported
intermediate inputs measure by using the 1987 Input/Output Tables for USA, and taking the
product of the relative use by each industry of all commodities and the ratio of Total Imports to
Apparent Consumption (Output+Imports-Exports) of each industry.
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Table G.10: List of all EUKLEMS Industries
Code Code Description
Manufacturing
AtB Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
C Mining and quarrying
15t16 Food products, beverages and tobacco
17t19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21t22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastics products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products
29 Machinery, not elsewhere classified
30t33 Electrical and optical equipment
34t35 Transport equipment
36t37 Manufacturing not elsewhere classified; recycling
Services
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of household goods
60t63 Transport and storage
64 Post and telecommunications
70 Real estate activities
71t74 Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities
E Electricity, gas and water supply
F Construction
H Hotels and restaurants
J Financial intermediation
L Public administration, defence, and compulsory social security
M Education
N Health and social work
O Other community, social and personal services
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Appendix H
Data Appendix: Chapter 3
H.1 Construction of main dataset
Our main dataset is EUKLEMS (http://www.euklems.net/), which is an industry-
level panel dataset created by economic researchers funded by the European Com-
mission. It covers the European Union, the US, Japan, and other countries, and
contains a wealth of information on productivity-related variables. These were con-
structed through joint work with census bureau in each country and are designed to
be internationally comparable. Details of the methodology are in Timmer, van Mo-
ergastel, Stuivenwold, Ypma, O’Mahony, and Kangasniemi (2007), Timmer, Inklaar,
O’Mahony, and van Ark (2010) and Timmer and O’Mahony (2009).
In the construction of our sample we faced a number of technical issues. First,
although college wage bill shares are reported for 30 industries in each country,
these reported wage bill shares are not unique within each country. For example, in
a certain country the reported college wage bill share for industry A and industry
B may be (college wage bill in A + college wage bill in B)/(total wage bill in A +
total wage bill in B). The identity and number of industries pooled together vary
across countries. In order to use as much of variation as possible, we aggregate
industries within each country up to the lowest level of aggregation that ensures
that the college wage bill share is unique across the aggregated observations. This
is also sufficient to ensure that other variables we use, such as our ICT and value
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added measures, have unique values across observations.
Second, as a measure of ICT intensity we use ICT capital compensation divided
by value added directly from EUKLEMs. ICT capital is built using the Perpetual In-
ventory method based on real ICT investment flows (using a quality-adjusted price
deflator). ICT capital compensation is the stock of ICT capital multiplied by its user
cost. Non-ICT capital compensation is built in the same way1.
Third, matching trade variables into our main dataset required data required
currency conversions, since EUKLEMS reports data in historical local currency and
COMTRADE reports data in historical dollars. To overcome this difference, we con-
vert nominal values to current US Dollars using exchange rates from the IMF IFS
website. To convert national currency to the Euro (for Eurozone countries), we use
exchange rates from the website:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/euro/transition/conversion rates.htm
We use trade figures from the UN’s COMTRADE dataset. Data is downloaded
in the four digit Standard International Trade Classification format (revision 2), and
converted to the European NACE Rev 1 classification used in the EUKLEMS dataset
(concordance available on request). Our trade regressions contain the updated data
from 21st March 2008.
To decompose trade into OECD versus non-OECD, we use the 2007 definition
of OECD countries (Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and the
USA). This means that Czechoslovakia and Belgium-Luxembourg were treated as
OECD countries in 1980.
1Because EUKLEMS calculates capital compensation as a residual in a few cases observations
can have negative capital compensation. Of the 208 country-industry cells we use, negative capital
compensation occurs in 12 cases in 1980 and in 3 cases in 2004. These are typically agriculture (which
is heavily subsidized and becomes smaller over time) and industries where public services play an
important role (e.g. education and health). To overcome this problem, we bottom-coded negative
values of ICT and non-ICT capital compensation to zero. Our results are robust to dropping these
observations from the sample.
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Finally, we account for the fact that the (aggregated) industries we use differ
substantially in their employment shares within each country’s population. We
therefore use the employment shares of each industry in 1980 (our base year) in
total employment as analytical weights in the regressions using both tradable and
non-tradable industries. For trade regressions, which use only the traded indus-
tries, each industry’s weight is its employment share in the traded industries for
that country, so that the sum of weights for each country is still equal to one.
H.2 Construction of task measures by skill
To construct measures of task content by occupation and education group, which
we use in Tables G.2 and G.1, we begin with US Census micro data for 1980 from
IPUMS, which identify each person’s occupation (using the three-digit 1980 occu-
pation definitions from IPUMS) and education (measured in years of schooling
completed). We assign each person to one of three educational categories - high,
medium, or low - using the EUKLEMS classification for the US. In other words,
high-skill workers are those who have at least 16 years of education, middle-skilled
workers are those with 13-15 years of education, and low-skilled workers are those
with 12 years of education. We then assign to each person the “80-90” occupation
code using the concordance from Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), and we match
to each occupation the task measures, which Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) de-
rive from the 1991 Dictionary of Occupational Titles. These include routine cog-
nitive tasks (measured using Set limits, Tolerances, or Standards); routine manual
tasks (measured using Finger Dexterity); non-routine cognitive tasks measured us-
ing both (i) Quantitative reasoning requirements and (ii) Direction, Control, and
Planning and non-routine manual tasks (measured using Eye-Hand-Foot coordina-
tion).
We then collapse the data to the occupation-skill level, using 1980 person weights
from IPUMS. Finally, we standardize each of these five task measures by subtracting
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the mean task score across occupations, weighted by person weights, and dividing
the resulting difference by the standard deviation of the task measure across occu-
pations. The results in Tables G.2 and G.1 discussed below use these standardized
task measures.
We calculate the intensity of occupation O in terms of skill level S ∈ {H, M, L}
as
ShareOS =
EOS
EO
,
where EoS is the number of people in occupation O with skill level S, and EO is the
total number of people with occupation O. We then rank the occupations in terms
of their intensity of each of the three skill groups, and Table 1 presents the ten top
occupations in each skill category, and the score of each of these occupations on each
task k.
Finally, we calculate the average score on each task k for each skill level S as
IkS =∑
O
EOS
ES
Iko ,
where IkO is occupation O’s score on task k, EoS is the number of people in occupation
O with skill level S, and ES is the total number of people with skill level S. These
scores are reported in Table G.1.
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